Renshaw v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 40512-2012 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
6-19-2013
Renshaw v. Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 40512-2012
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation
"Renshaw v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 40512-2012" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court
Records & Briefs. 869.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/869
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
GREGORY RENSHAW, an individual, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, j 
) 
V. ) 
) 
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION ) 
SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware corporation, ) ) 
Defendant-Respondent, j 
) 
and ) 
) 
HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL, LLC, a Delaware) 
limited liability company; EXECUTIVE ) 
TRUSTEE SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware limited j 
liability company; DOES I-V, and ABC ) 
CORPORATIONS I-V, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) ) 
Supreme Court Docket No. 40512-2012 
Ada County Docket No. 2010-23898 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal of Gregory Renshaw v. Homecomings Financial, LLC, et al in the Fourth Judicial 
District of the State ofidaho, 
in and for the County of Ada, Case No. CV OC 1023898 
Honorable Deborah Bail, Presiding District Judge 
John L. Runft, ISB #1059 
Jon M. Steele, ISB # 1911 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main St., Ste 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
Tel : (208) 333-8506 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
e-mail: JSteele@runftsteele.com 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Michael G. Halligan, ISB # 6874 
Sussman Shank LLP 
1000 SW Broadway, Suite 1400 
Portland, OR 97205-3089 
Tel: (503) 227-1111 
Fax: (503) 248-0130 
e-mail: mikeh({/)sussmanshank.com 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
GREGORY RENSHAW, an individual, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, j 
) 
V. ) 
) 
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION ) 
SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware corporation, ) ) 
Defendant-Respondent, j 
) 
and ) 
) 
HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL, LLC, a Delaware) 
limited liability company; EXECUTIVE ) 
TRUSTEE SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware limited j 
liability company; DOES I-V, and ABC ) 
CORPORATIONS I-V, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) ) 
Supreme Court Docket No. 40512-2012 
Ada County Docket No. 2010-23898 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal of Gregory Renshaw v. Homecomings Financial, LLC, et al in the Fourth Judicial 
District of the State ofldaho, 
in and for the County of Ada, Case No. CV OC 1023898 
Honorable Deborah Bail, Presiding District Judge 
John L. Runft, ISB #1059 
Jon M. Steele, ISB # 1911 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC 
1020 W. Main St., Ste 400 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Tel : (208) 333-8506 
Fax : (208) 343-3246 
e-mail: JSteele(ciJ,rnnftsteele.com 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Michael G. Halligan, ISB # 6874 
Sussman Shank LLP 
1000 SW Broadway, Suite 1400 
Portland, OR 97205-3089 
Tel: (503) 227-1111 
Fax: (503) 248-0130 
e-mail: mikeh(lvsussmanshank. com 
Attorney for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS...................................................................... i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................. iii 
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................... . 
IL MERS WAS CREATED TO DODGE STA TE AND LOCAL 
RECORDING REQUIREMENTS................................................. 2 
III. THE DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO THE AMENDED 
COMPLAINT, THE AFFIDAVITS, THE DEPOSITIONS, THE 
DEFENDANT'S ADMISSIONS ON FILE AND THE 
JUDICIALLY NOTICED PAPERS ARE PROOF THAT 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST............................ 3 
IV. EDWARDS AND TROTTER ARE CLEARLY DISTINGUISHABLE....... 5 
V. JUNE 6, 2013 DECISIONS OF THE OREGON SUPREME COURT...... 6 
VI. RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AW ARD OF ATTORNEY 
FEES.................................................................................... 9 
VII. CONCLUSION....................................................................... 10 
APPENDIX 
1. Brandup v. Recontrust Company, NA., Oregon Supreme Court, 
June 6, 2013 ...................................................................... . 
2. Niday v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, et al, Oregon Supreme Court, 
June 6, 2013 ...................................................................... . 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Brandup v. Reconstrust Company, NA., et al, filed June 6, 2013 
(Oregon Supreme Court 2013) .................................................................... 7, 8 
Edwards v. Jvlortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 
2013 Opinion No. 53, Docket No. 38604-2011. ......................................... 5, 6, 9, 10 
Gilman v. Davis, 138 Idaho 599, 67 P.3d 78 (2003) .............................................. 9 
Jackson v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W. 2d 487 (Minn. 2009) ......... 1 
Niday v. G1\!fAC Afortg., LLC, 251 Or. App. 278, 284 P.3d 1157 (2012) ................ 6, 7, 8 
Ralph v.1'4et Life Home Loans, Case No. CV 2010-0200 in and for 
the Fifth Judicial County of the State ofidaho, County of Minidoka, 
August 10, 2011 ..................................................................................... 1, 3 
Trotter v. Bank of New York Mellon, et al, 275 P.3d 857 (Idaho 2012) .............. 2, 5, 6, 10 
STATUTES & RULES 
Idaho Appellate Rule 40 ............................................................................... 9 
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 ............................................................................... 9 
11 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Respondent's argument fails to address the facts of this case. Its entire argument is 
generic, founded upon statutory construction, and fails to address its pleadings, its discovery 
responses, the affidavits, depositions, and judicially noticed papers that are all a part of the 
Clerk's Record. Its reliance upon the Minnesota Supreme Court case Jackson v. Mortgage Elec. 
Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W. 2d 487 (Minn. 2009) is faulty. Minnesota adopted legislation 
recognizing MERS and allowing it to "privatize" portions of its nonjudicial foreclosure 
proceedings. 
Appellant stands in a position disfavored by the law. He made his last mortgage 
payment in May of 20 l 0. Respondent, like other financially powerful entities, knows that 
homeowners who are unable to pay their mortgages are unlikely to challenge the foreclosure and 
loss of their home. This lack of challenges encourages the Respondent and other powerful 
financial institutions to take short cuts, to neglect critical and necessary documentation, and to 
ignore the law. The Respondent has little at stake or risk. 
Respondent has, often and repeatedly, been denied foreclosure in cases throughout Idaho. 
Cases such as Ralph v. MetL(fe (R., pp. 652-662). But those cases are buried. They are not 
reported, they are not appealed and they are discounted by the financial industry as outliers. 
Through manipulation of our legal system, not only on an individual basis but also on a macro 
basis, Defendant and the financial industry are able to cite this Court to decisions that favor its 
position. But in these cases, the litigant is often a pro se homeowner who has no idea how to 
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defeat a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. Many of these homeowners 
make credible arguments (such as Trotter) but have no evidence or citation to legal authority to 
support their arguments. Appellant has presented the District Court and this Court with 
evidence, legal authorities, and credible arguments that defeat Respondent's entitlement to 
summary judgment. 
II. 
MERS WAS CREATED TO DODGE STATE AND 
LOCAL RECORDING REQUIREMENTS 
Respondent would have this Court believe that it has solved title problems rather than 
created title problems. See, Respondent's Opening Brief, pp. 7-8. This contention ignores 
hundreds of years of statutory and common law and ignores the function of local government in 
maintaining accurate up-to-date land title records. In the words of District Court Judge Bail, 
MERS was created in part to dodge state and local recording requirements and MERS' structure 
skirts Idaho law that requires the public recording of the assignment of the trust deed. R., pp. 
3390-3391. The MERS structure hanns counties who then do not have accurate records, an 
issue of serious historical concern and also deprives counties of recording income. "The MERS 
structure does harm state and county interests and was intended to evade recording obligations 
and fees .... " R., pp. 3391-3392 
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III. 
THE DEFENDANT'S ANSvVER TO THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, THE 
AFFIDAVITS, THE DEPOSITIONS, THE DEFENDANT'S ADMISSIONS ON FILE 
AND THE JUDICIALLY NOTICED PAPERS ARE PROOF THAT 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST 
Included within the Clerk's Record are the pleadings, affidavits, discovery responses and 
judicially noticed papers that prove, at the very least, genuine issues of fact exist that defeat 
Respondent's entitlement to summary judgment. Respondent's Answer to the Amended 
complaint found at Clerk's Record, pages 243-260 includes admissions which create genuine 
issues of fact. 
Appellant's First Request for Judicial Notice (R., p. 449) includes items 1-19 which were 
judicially noticed and are included in the Record. Request No. 5 (R., p. 652-662) is the Idaho 
District Court's case of Ralph v. ~MetLife decided by Minidoka County District Court, Judge 
Jonathan Brody. The Ralph decision is exactly on point. 
As the Clerk's Record demonstrates this case is not an isolated event. During the period 
from March 17, 2009 to June 11, 2011, 47 Notices of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of 
Trust were executed on behalf of Defendant MERS and recorded in Ada County. R., pp. 461-
556. During the period of February 26, 2009 to July 12, 2011, 39 Notices of Default and 
Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust were recorded in Canyon County, Idaho. R., pp. 558-650. 
Appellant has made two applications for a loan modification and been denied twice. The 
Record clearly demonstrates that Defendant has violated the Home Affordable Modification 
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Program. See, R., p. 817. These denials are evidence of negligence and violation of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act. 
On the record before the Court there is no evidence to show, let alone prove, that 
Defendant had any interest, let alone the beneficial interest, in Renshaw's property. 
On the record before the Court there is an abundance of evidence that Renshaw's loan 
was transferred multiple times. These assignments were not by operation of law but were true 
conveyances ofRenshaw's Note and Deed of Trust. 
On the record before the Court there is no issue of fact concerning the recording of the 
Renshaw loan transfers. There is no recording of the multiple transfers. 
On the record before the Court it is uncontroverted that Defendant has no stake or 
interest of any kind in Renshaw's loan, his Note or his Deed of Trust. 
On the record before the Court there is no issue of fact that Respondent failed to satisfy 
the precondition that "any" assignment of the trust deed by the beneficiary be recorded prior to 
commencing foreclosure. 
On the record before the Court the failure to record any assignment prior to commencing 
foreclosure violates the nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings of the Idaho Trust Deed Act. 
Renshaw has put admissible evidence supporting his assertions of negligence, errors in 
foreclosure, misrepresentation, robo-signing, and fraud into the record. Expert reports of Mr. 
Kahn, Ms. Emery, and Mr. Eppink detail the flaws, mistakes and misrepresentations of 
Defendant. 
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Defendant's pleadings and discovery responses, at a minimum, create triable issues of 
fact. Appellant has by affidavits, pleadings, discovery responses, and judicial notice, at the very 
least, created triable issues of fact concerning Defendant's conduct in commencing nonjudicial 
foreclosure proceedings against Appellant. 
IV. 
EDWARDS AND TROTTER ARE CLEARLY DISTINGUISHABLE 
The Idaho Deed of Trust Act is a well-coordinated statutory scheme designed to be 
strictly construed to protect the grantor of a deed of trust. The Idaho law governing deeds of 
trust makes no provision for the use of an entity such as MERS to supplant its requirements. 
Recognizing that the Idaho Deed of Trust Act permits foreclosure without the necessity for 
judicial actions, this Court has made it clear that the trustee's power of sale is subject to strict 
statutory rules designed to protect the grantor. Nonjudicial foreclosure is allowed only where 
the trust deed and any assignments of the trust deed by the trustee or the beneficiary are recorded 
in the mortgage records in the counties in which the property described in the deed is situated. 
In order to protect the grantor against the unauthorized loss of its property a party conducting a 
nonjudicial foreclosure must demonstrate strict compliance with the Act. 
In the recent case of Edwards v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 2013 
Opinion No. 53, Docket No. 38604-2011 (Idaho Supreme Court), this Court stated that "[i]f 
Plaintiff contends that ownership of the note and deed of trust had been severed, that documents 
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may have been improperly signed, or that the notarization process was fraudulent, she should 
have put into the record admissible evidence supporting such assertions. She did not." Id. at p. 
10. 
In Edwards, this Court found that the deed of trust was not given for the benefit of 
MERS or to secure an obligation owing to MERS. Yet, the Edwards court found that "having 
MERS the named beneficiary as nominee for the lender conforms to the requirements of a deed 
of trust under Idaho law." This conclusion was reached on the basis that MERS was designated 
the beneficiary in its representative capacity as nominee for the lender. 
In both Edwards and Trotter, this Court gave carte blanche to MERS and its lenders to 
conduct nonjudicial foreclosures in Idaho. Based upon the record before the Court in each of 
these cases the Court's decisions were correct. Other courts have also given MERS and its 
lenders approval based upon statutory interpretation of those states' deed of trust statutes. 
However, the most recent cases analyzing MERS structure and whether it complies with state 
deed of trust acts have found that MERS is not entitled to the reviewing Court's blanket 
approval. 
V. 
JUNE 6, 2013 DECISIONS OF THE OREGON SUPREME COURT 
The case of Niday v. GMAC Nlortg., LLC, 251 Or. App. 278, 284 P.3d 1157 (2012) was 
cited by the trial court as authority that MERS' structure skirts Idaho law requiring the recording 
of the assignments of deeds of trust. This intermediate Court of Appeals case was very recently 
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reviewed and decided by the Oregon Supreme Court. 
Two Oregon Supreme Court cases, Brandup v. Reconstrust Company, NA., et al, filed 
June 6, 2013 (Oregon Supreme Court 2013) and Niday v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, filed June 6, 
2013 (Oregon Supreme Court 2013) 1 qualify MERS' entitlement to use of the nonjudicial 
foreclosure statutes of Oregon. 
In response to four certified questions from the United States District Court, the Oregon 
Supreme Court found the following: 
1. An entity like MERS, which is not a lender, may not be a trnst deeds 
"beneficiary" unless it is a lenders' successor in interest. 
2. The provision that MERS "holds only legal title to the interests granted by 
Borrower in this Security Instrnment, but, if necessary to comply with law 
or custom, MERS *** has the right to exercise any or all of those 
interest," does not convey to MERS the beneficial right to repayment of 
the secured obligation, the inclusion of the provision does not alter the 
trust deed's designation of the lender as the "beneficiary" or make MERS 
eligible to serve in that capacity. 
3. The Oregon Trust Deeds Act does not reqmre recordation of 
"assignments" of the trust deed by operation of law that result from the 
transfer of the secured obligation. However, the trne beneficiary must be 
identifiable. Where the foreclosing party is not the original lender, the 
1 See, Respondent's Opening Brief at p. 17. "Niday is not a final statement of Oregon law ... " As of June 6, 2013, 
Niday is a final statement of Oregon law. 
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foreclosing party must provide definitive documentation of its status as 
the lender's successor in interest to establish its right to foreclosure. 
When lenders or successors in interest fail to record definitive 
documentation they are vulnerable to challenges that may force them to 
judicially establish their interest and authority to act. Niday at p. 36. 
4(a) Because MERS does not have the right to receive payment of the note, the 
Oregon Deed of Trust Act does not allow MERS to hold and transfer legal 
title to the trust deeds that secure them. 
MERS holds neither the beneficial nor the legal interest of the trustee and 
therefore it cannot hold or transfer legal title to the trust deed. Niday at 
pp. 46-47. 
4(b) MERS authority, if any, to perform any act in the foreclosure process 
derives from the original beneficiary and its successors in interest. Niday 
at p. 47. 
In Niday v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, et al, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment to MERS, et al. The Court found that " ... an issue of fact 
remains as to the validity of ETS 's appointment as successor trustee, and, in consequence, its 
authority to initiate and pursue a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding under the ODT A." 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - Page 8 
Because the nonjudicial process does not involve a court, the legislature--in adopting the 
Idaho Deed of Trust Act-wanted to substitute other safeguards to adequately protect borrowers. 
These safeguards have been ignored by Respondent. 
VI. 
RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN A vV ARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
Respondent contends at p. 24 of its Brief that it is entitled to its fees and costs on appeal 
pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and 41. However, neither of these appellate rules provides the authority 
for awarding attorney fees. See, Edwards at 12, citing Gilman v. Davis, 138 Idaho 599, 67 P.3d 
78 (2003). 
Respondent also contends that this appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation. This contention is wildly inaccurate and finds no support in the law or the 
record of this case. 
Lastly, Respondent contends that it is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to the deed of 
trust because of Section 9, Protection of Lender's Interest in the Property Under This Security 
Instrument. The preamble to this section limits its application to "Borrower and Lender." See, 
R., p. 168. MERS has contended it is the "Beneficiary." It has never contended that it is also 
the "Lender." The "Lender" is no longer a party to this action and has taken no action to protect 
its interest under the deed of trust. 
Appellant, upon prevailing in this appeal, is entitled to an award of attorney fees and 
costs. 
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vu. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the Court's rulings in Trotter and Edwards, based upon the record in this case, 
Appellant is entitled to present his case to the jury. The district court's grant of summary 
judgment to the Defendant should be reversed and the case remanded to the district court for jury 
trial on Plaintiffs negligence and consumer protection causes of action. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of June 2013. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certified that on this 19th day of June 2013, a true and correct 
copy of the APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF was served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
Michael G. Halligan 
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1000 SW Broadway, Suite 1400 
Portland, OR 97205-3089 
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Filed: June 6, 2013 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON 
BART G. BRANDRUP 
and JESSICA D. BRANDRUP, 
husband and wife, 
v. 
RECONTRUST COiVIPANY, N.A.: 
BANK OF /\Jv1ERICA, N.A., 
successor by merger with BAC Home Loans Servicing. LP: 
TH.E BANK OF NEW YORK l'v1ELLON, 
fka The Bank of NeYv York .. 
as Trnstee for The Certificate Holders Cwalt. Inc .. 
Alternative Loan Trnst 2006-2CB. ivfortgage Pass-throngh Cettificates; 
and MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEJvIS,INC. , 
United States District Court 31 1CV1390HZ 
RUSSELL R. PO\VELL 
and D IANE L. POWE LL, 
husband and 'Nife, 
V . 
RECONTRUST CO~fPANY. N .A .: 
BANK OF AI\1ERICA, N .A , 
successor by merger with BAC Home Loans Servic ing, LP: 
THE BANK OF NE\V YORK l\llELLON, 
Plc1 in tiffs, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs, 
fka The Bank of New York, as Trustee for The Certi.ficale Holders Cwalt , Inc . 
Alternat ive Loan Trust 2007-0HJ , 
Mortgage Pass-through Certificates. series 2007-0H3: 
and MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS,INC. . 
Defendants. 
U nited States District Court 311 CV1 399HZ 
DEANIRA 1\1A "YO 
and REYNALDA PAEZ PLANCARTE, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
RECONTRUST C01'vfPANY, N.A.: 
BANK OF Atv1ERICA, N.A., 
sHccessor by merger with Bae Home Loans Servicing, LP: 
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COivIPAN'{, 
as Trustee for the Certificate llolders of the 1\!Iorpm Stanley ABS Capital L Inc ... 
Trust 2005-HE2, 
j\fortgage Pass-through Certificates .. Series 2005-HE2: 
and MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION S'{STEMSJNC.. 
United States District Court 311CVI533SI 
OMID MIRARABSHAHI, 
\!. 
RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A.: 
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., 
successor by 1nerger with Bae llome Loans Servicing, LP: 
'!TIE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff, 
lka The Bank of New York, as Trustee for The Certificate Ifolclers of C\VMBS, INC., 
CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-4, 
l\fortgage Pass-through Certificates, Series 2007-4: 
aucl lvfORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION S'i"STEMSJNC., 
Eu Banc 
Uuited States District Court 3 l 2CVOO l OHA 
(SC S06028 l) 
Defendants. 
On certified questions from the United States District Court; certification order 
elated April 2, 2012, certification accepted July 19, 2012, argued and submitted January 8, 
2013. 
2 
Jeffrey A. l'vfyers. BO\vles Fernnndez Law LLC, Lake Oswego, argued the cm1se 
for plaintiffs. With him on the briefs were Jeffrey A. !vf yers, John Bowles. and Rick 
Fernnndez. 
Gregory A Chairnov, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Portland argued the cause for 
defendant Mortgage Electronic Rcgistrntion Systems, Inc. With hin1 on the brief were 
Kevin H. Kono. Frederick B. Burnside. and P. Andrevv l'vfcStay, Jr.. Davis Wright 
Tremaine LLP, Portlm1d. 
Thmuas iv!. Hefferon, Goodwin Proctor LLP, Wnshi11gto11 DC, argued the cause 
for defendants ReconTrust Company, N.A.; Bank of America, N.A.: The Bank of New 
York Mellon; and Deutsche Bank National Trnst Company. With him 011 the brief were 
Steven A. Ellis, Washington DC. and Thomas W. Sondag. Pilar C. French. and Peter D. 
Hawkes. Lane Powell PC. Portland. 
Rolf C. l\1oan. Assistm1t Attorney General. Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney GenernL 
and A1111a M. Joyce, Solicitor General. filed a brief on behalf of omiclfs c lfrioe State of 
Oregon. 
Nanina D. Taki a, Law Office of Phil Golclsrnith, Portland. filed a brief on behalf 
of an1ic11s curiae Oreg.on Trial Lawyers Associatiou. 
Sara Kobak, W l\1ichael Gillette. a11d Jordan Silk, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, 
PC, Po1ila11d, filed a brief on behalf of amic11s rnriae Oreg.on Land Title Associa tion. 
Thomas W Brown, Thomas rvL Christ , and Robert E. Sabido, Cosgrave Vergeer 
Kester LLP, Port land, riled a brief 011 behalf of amici curiae f'viortgate Bankers 
Association, Oregon Bankers Association, and lndependeut Community Banks of 
Oregon. 
BRE\VER, J. 
Certified questions nnswcred. 
Kistler. .J.. concurred in pmt and dissented in part, an filed an opi11io11 in vvliich 
Balmer. C.L joined. 
3 
BREWER . .l. 
2 These cases come before this court 011 four certified ques tions of lavv from 
3 the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. See Br(1nrlrup v. Recon Trust 
4 Co., 352 Or 320, 287 P3d 423 (20 I 2) (accepti11g certified questions): ORS 28.200 to 
:'i 28 .25.'i (providing procedure for certifying questions to the Oregon Supreme Court and 
6 authorizing. court to answer cert iried quest ions) . The qllestions a II are co11cernecl with a 
7 practice that has arise11 in the home mortgage industry i11 the last twe11ty years -- that of 
8 dratting mortgages and trust deeds so that a certain De laware corpon1tio1L l'vfortgagc 
9 Electronic Reg istrntion Systems, Inc. (MERS). rather than the lender. is identified as the 
l 0 security ins trument's "mortgagee" or "benefi ciary." That practice allo\l\1S lenders and 
11 other entities dcali11g in home loans to track their transactions in a database lllaintained by 
12 !VIERS. 111 Oregon, the prnctice has come u11dcr scrnti11y in a number of foreclosnre cases 
13 aris ing u11der the Oregon Trus t Deed A ct (OTDA), ORS 86.705 to ORS 86.795. 
14 As will be explained more full y below, the OTDA prov ides an alt ernative 
l S to the trnditio11al jltclicial foreclosure process that is available only when the home loan is 
16 secured by a trust deed, and, even then, only when certain conditions arc satis fi ed. One 
1 7 co11ditio11 for foreclos in~ under the OTDJ\ is that "any asSif!,Illllents" of the trust deed by 
18 the trust deed "benefic iary" be recorclecl in the real property records of the county where 
19 the encumbered property is s ituated. O RS 86. 7 3 5(1 ). Some homeowners threatened w ith 
20 foreclosure under th e OTDA have recognized that, alt hough the origina l lenders 
21 transferred their int eres ts to other part ies, the changes i11 benefic ia l o wnership \Vere not 
22 recorded in the real proper ty records o f the counties where their properties are situated. 
Those homemvners have resisted foreclosure under the OTDA on the ground that the 
2 transfers were not recorded. They argue. h1ter alio. that ORS 86.735(1) requires the 
3 recording of any assignment of a trnst deed by the owner of the beneficial interest in the 
4 trust deed and that the identification of Iv1ERS as the trust deed "beneficiary" is 
5 ineffective. 
6 Some cases filed in Oregon state courts that have raised these issues have 
7 been removed to federal court, and the judges \Vithi11 the District of Oregon have used 
8 differing analyses and reached differing conclusions. See, e.g.. Sm·ereign v. Deutsche 
9 Bank. 856 F Supp 2d 1203 (D Or 2012): James v. R.econTrusr Co .. 845 F Supp 2d 1145 
10 (D Or 2012); Reeves v. R.econTrusl Co., 8116 F Supp 2d I 149 (D Or 2012); Heyer v. Bank 
11 of America, 800 F Supp 2d I 157 (D Or 2011 ). Recognizing that the issues turn 011 the 
12 pi oper co11struction of Oregon statutes and that this court is the ultimate arbiter of such 
13 matters. the district court in these cases certified the following questions to this court: 
14 Certified Question No. 1: May an entity, such as l'v1ERS, that is 
15 neither a lender nor successor to a lender, be a 'beneficiary' as that term is 
16 used in the Oregon Trust Deed Act? 
17 Certified Question No. 2: May Iv1ERS be designated as beneficiary 
18 u11der the Oregon Trnst Deed Act \Vhere the trust deed provides that tvfERS 
19 "holds only legal title to the interests granted by Borrmver in this Security 
20 Iustrument. but, if necessary to co1nply with lavv or custom. l\IERS (as 
21 nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) has the right: to 
22 exercise any or all of those interests"? 
23 Certified Question No. 3: Does the transfer of a promissory note 
24 from the lender to a successor result in an automatic assignment of the 
2.5 securing trust deed that must be recorded prior to the commencement of 
26 nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings under ORS 86.735(1)? 
27 Certified Question No 4: Does the Oregon Trust Deed Act allow 
2 
ivfERS to retai11 and tnmsfer lega l title to a trust deed as nominee for the 
2 lender, after the note secured by the trust deed is trnnsfened from the fernier 
3 to a successor or series of successors? 
4 \Ve accepted the district court's certification and allowed the parties in the federal cases to 
5 present their viev.rs. We answer those questions -- in two instances as reframed -- as 
6 follows : 
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(1) "No." For purposes of ORS 86.73 5(1), the "beneficiary" is the lender 
to whom the obligation that the trnst deed secures is owed or the 
lender's successor in interest. Thus. an entit y like l\!ERS, which is not 
a lender. may not be a trus t deed's "beneficiary," unless it is a lender's 
successor in interest. 
(2) We refrnrne the second question as follows: 
Is 1\1ERS ehg ib/e to serve as beneficiary under the Oregon Trust Deed 
Act where the trust deed provides that l'vIERS "holds only legal title to 
the interests granted by Borrower in this Security Instrnment , but, if 
necessary to comply vvith lmv or custom, 1vfERS as nominee for 
Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) has the right : to exercise 
any or all of those interests"') 
A nswer: "No." A ''beneficiary" for purposes of the OTDA is the 
person to whom the obligat ion that the trust deed secures is owed. At 
the time of origination, that person is the lender. The trust deeds in 
these cases designate the lender as the benefic iary, when they provide: 
"This Security Instrument secures to Lender : (i) the repayment of the 
loan, and all renewals, extensions and modifications of the note; and 
(ii) the performance of borrO\ver's covenant s and agreeme11ts under 
this security ins trument and the note." Because the provision that 
MERS "ho lds only leg.al tit le to the interes ts granted by Bonovver 111 
this Secmity Instrument, but_ if necessary to comply with law or 
custom, l'vIERS * * * has the right to exercise any or all of those 
interests ," does not convey to rvfERS the beneficial right to repayment, 
the inclusion of that provision does not a lter the trust deed's 
des ignation of the lender as the "beneficiary '' or make l'vfERS elig ible 
to serve in that capacity . 
(3) "No." ORS 86. 735(1) does not require record a ti on of "assig nments" 
of a trust deed by operation of law that result from the trans fer of the 
seemed obligation. 
(4) \Ve answer the ques tion. as rcfrmncd below, in two parts : 
2 (tl)(a) "Does the Oregon Trust Deed Act allmv l'vlERS to hold and transfer 
3 legal title to a trust deed as nominee for the lender, after the note secured 
4 by the trust deed is transfeITecl from the lender to a successor or seri es of 
S successors?" 
6 Answer: "No." For prnvoses of the OTDA, the only pertinent interests in 
7 the trnst deed are the beneficial interes t of the beneficiary and the legal 
8 interest of the trustee. MERS holds neither of those interests in these cases, 
9 and. therefore, it cannot hold or transfer lega l title to the trus t deed. For 
10 purposes of our answer to the first part of the fourth certified question, it is 
l l immaterial whether til e note secured by the trust deed has previously been 
12 "trn11sferrecl from the lender to a successor or series of successors." 
13 ('l)(b) "Does MERS nevertheless have authority as an agent fo r the 
14 original lender and its successors in interest to act on their behalves with 
IS respect to the transfer of the beneficial interest in the trust deed or the 
16 nonjudicial foreclosure process?" 
l 7 Answer: The power to transfer the beneficial interes t in a trnst deed or to 
18 foreclose it follows the beneficial interest in the trnst deed. The beneficiary 
19 or its successor in interest holds those rights. IvJERS's authority, if any, to 
20 perform any act in the foreclosure process there fore must derive from the 
21 original beneficiary and its successors in interest. We are unable to 
22 determine the existence, scope, or extent of any such authority 011 the 
23 record before us. 
24 As a preface to onr explanation of those answers, we set out the following lega l and 
25 factual background. 
26 I.BACKGROUND 
27 A . 1\Iortgoges, Ii·ust Deeds, and the Oregon frust Deed Act 
28 \Vhen a person borrows money to purchase a home, in Oreg.on as 
29 elsewhere, the Imm usually is m emorialized in a promi ssory note that contains the 
30 borrower's \vritten. unconditional promise to pay certain stuns at a specified time or 
31 tirn es. Ge11crnlly, the borrower and lender a lso enter into a separa tely- memorialized 
4 
security agreement -- a mortgage or. more commonly in Oregon. a trnst deed. See 
2 generalzr Grant Nelson and Dale Whitman. Real Estote Finance Lmv §§ 2. L 5.27. 5.28 
3 (5th ed 2007): Joseph L. Dunne. Enforcing the Oregon Trust Deed Act, 49 \Villarnette L 
4 Rev 77. 81-85 (2012). Oregon subscribes to the "lien theory," rather than the ''title 
S theory." of mortgages. Under the title theory. the borrower conveys actual title to the 
6 burde11ed property to the le11der lo secure the obligation to repay. Under the lien theory. 
7 the borrower merely conveys a "right. upon co11ditio11 broken. to have the mortgage 
8 foreclosed and the mortgagee! property sold to satisf)r [the underlying debt]." Sch!eefv. 
9 P11rt~1·. 107 Or 71. 78. 214 P 13 7 ( 1923 ). Thus. in the traditional security arrangement --
10 the mortgage -- the borrmver conveys to the lender a lien on the property being 
11 purchased. to secure the promise to repay that is contained in a promissory note. If the 
12 borrower defaults on the note. the lender, or the lender's successor in interest. may 
13 exercise its right to sell the property to satisfy the obligation. but it must do so by 
14 bringing a judicial action against the borrower. Id at 75- 79: ORS 88.010 (except as 
1 S otherwise provided by law. lien upon real property shall be foreclosed by a suit). 
I 6 The OTDA, Or Laws 1959. ch 625. codified at ORS 86. 705 to ORS 86. 795. 
17 was e11acled in 1959 to provide an alternative to the judicial foreclosure process. Ronald 
18 Brady Tippetts, Note, Mortages Tmst Deeds· in Oregon. 44 Or L Rev 1119. 149-50 
19 ( 1965). That nonjudicial alternative is available wheu the parties use a trust deed to 
20 secure the loan. A trust deed is a deed executed under the OTDA that "conveys an 
21 interest in real property to a trustee m tmst to secure the performance of an obligation the 
22 gnmtor or other person nmned in the deed o\ves to a beneficiary." ORS 86. 705(7). The 
OTDA permits the trustee appointed under a trust deed to advertise ancl sell the property 
2 to the highest bidder \vithout judicial involvement. ORS 86.710; ORS 86.755. Like a 
3 mortgage, a trust deed creates a lien on real property to secure an underlying obligation in 
4 the event of a default. See ORS 86. 705(7); see also Sam Paulsen Afasom:r v. Higley, 276 
5 Or 107 I. l 075, 557 P2d 676 ( 1976) (mortgage or trust deed creates only lien on real 
6 property). IndeecL a trnst deed creates 111.·o distinct interests -- a legal interest and a 
7 beneficial iuterest. First a trust deed "conveys an interest in real property to a trustee in 
8 trust to secure the performance of an obligation." ORS 86. 705(7). That legal interest 
9 includes the pm,ver to sell the obligated property in the manner prescribed in the statute 
10 on the grantor's default. ORS 86.710. However, if the trustee utilizes its pcnver of sale, 
11 the proceeds of the sale. after expenses, must be applied "to the obligation secured by the 
12 trust deed" -- that is. to satisfy the obligation that the borrower owes to the beneficiary. 
13 ORS 86.765(2). Accordingly, the trustee holds and exercises its legal interest in the 
14 encumbered property for the benefit of the trust deed's "beneficiary" -- the person "named 
15 or otherwise designated in [the] trust deed as the person for whose benefit [the] trnst deed 
16 is given." ORS 86. 705( l). The second mteresl that is created by a trust deed -- the 
17 beneficial or equitable i11terest in the lien granted thereiu -- thus is held by the 
18 beneficiary. That interest is the security for the performance of the obligation that is 
19 owed to the beneficiary. ORS 86.705(7). 
20 A trustee 1nay conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale only when certain 
21 conditions are satisfied. See ORS 86. 735 (setting out conditions). Those conditions 
22 include: (I) recording of "[t]he trust deed, any assignments of the trust deed by the 
6 
trustee or the beneficiary and any appointment of a successor trustee* * * in the 
2 mortgage records of the counties in which the property described in the deed is situated." 
3 ORS 86. 735( l ): (2) a default on the obligation, "the performance of\vhich is secured by 
4 the trust deed," ORS 86.735(2): (3) recording of a notice of default containing the 
5 trustee's or beneficiary's election to sell the property to satisfy the obligation. ORS 
6 86.735(3): and (:I) the absence ofa11y pending or co1npleted action for recovery of the 
7 debt with limited exceptions. S'ee, e.g, ORS 86.735(4). 
8 In addition to those conditions. the OTDA prescribes notice requirements 
9 that protect trust deed grantors from unauthorized nonjudicial foreclosures and sales of 
l 0 property. Among other things, a trustee is required to provide to the grnntor and other 
11 interested parties at least 120 days' advance notice of the trustee's sale. ORS 86.7110(1). 
12 Although judicial involvement is not required to complete a foreclosure by advertisement 
13 and sale, the 120-clay advance notice period gives a grantor time to seek judicial 
14 intervention in certain circumstances. as plaintiffs in these cases have clone. 
15 The grantor has a right to cure the default at any time up to five days 
16 before the date lasl set for the sale. ORS 86.753. If the trustee has co111plicd \Vith the 
17 statutory notice requirclllcnts and the default is not cured, the trnstee may sell the 
18 prope11y at a public auction to the highest bidder Yvithout judicial oversight. ORS 86.755. 
19 In contrast to the judicial foreclosure process, a grnntor has no statutory right to redeem 
20 the property afler a completed trustee's sale. Compare ORS 88.080 (providing right of 
21 redemption a fl er sale) with ORS 86. 770( I) (trustee's sale forecloses and terminates 
22 interests in property of any perso11 to whom required notice of the sale was given). After 
7 
a trustee's sale. the trustee must execute and deliver a trustee's deed to the purchaser, 
2 \Vhich must recite details of the foreclosure. ORS 86. 77 5. If the trustee's deed is 
3 recorded in the pertinent county records. the facts recited in the deed are considered 
4 primafocie evidence of the truth of the matters set forth therein. and are conclusive in 
5 favor of a purchaser for value who relies on them in good faith. ORS 86. 780. 
6 Of course. on! y a small portion of the property transact ions involving trust 
7 deeds end in foreclosure. lf tbe borrower repays the loan secured by the trust deed in foll. 
8 the trustee must "reconvey the estate of real property described i11 the trust deed" (that is, 
9 release the lien on the property) to the borroweL ORS 86. 720. and that reconveyance may 
l 0 be publicly recorded in the pertinent real property records . 
11 
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B. . '1ssignmen/ ond Recording of Trust Deeds 
:rv1ortgages or trust deeds may be transferred in a variety of ways. By 
statute. mortgages may be "assigned by an instrnment in writing." and such written 
assignments may be recorded in the pertinent real property records. ORS 86.060 
("mortoaoes mav be assio11ed bv an instnunent in writino * * * and recorded in the 0 t"' _, t"' ./ ~ 
records of niortgages of the countv where the land is situated"). 1 But mortgages also 
,__ " "' ' \..-, (._ 
have been held to "follow" the promissory notes that they secure so that. by operation of 
law. the sale or transfer of a promissory note effects an equitable transfer of the mortgage 
Although that statute initially was enacted with 1nortgages iu mincL it 
applies equally to trust deeds. 5'ee ORS 86.715 ("a trust deed is deemed to be a mortgage 
on real property and is subject to all lmvs relating to mortgages 011 real property except to 
the extent that such laws are inconsistent with [the OTDAJ"). 
8 
that secures that note. Bamberger v. Geiser, 211 Or 203, 206-07. 33 P 609 (1893) ("vvhere 
2 a debt is secured by mortgage. the debt is the principal and the mortgage is the incident 
3 and * * * an assign111e11 t of the debt is an assignment of the mortgage"): Barringer v. 
4 Loder, 47 Or 223. 229. 81 P 778 (1905) (same). 1 
5 Although the recordation of a mortgage or trnst deed assignment generally 
6 is not required to make the transfer legally effective between the parties. it is necessary 
7 and desirable for protecting an assignee's iuterest under the security instrument against a 
8 purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration. See TVillamette Col & Credit 5'en· v. 
9 Gray. 157 Or 77. 83. 70 P2d 39 ( 1937) (assignee of mortgage was not obliged to take and 
10 record \vritten assignrnent to acquire title as between immediate parties but was required 
11 to do so to maintain lien against innocent purchaser): see also ORS 93.640 (every 
12 conveyance. deed, or assignment affecting au interest in real property \Vhich is not 
13 recorded as provided by law is void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith for 
14 valuable consideration). The recorclation of a trust deed assignment is necessary for an 
15 additional reason: As described above, Or at (slip op at 6-7), the trust deed and 
16 "any assignments of the trnst deed by the trustee or the beneficiary" must be recorded Ill 
l 7 the relevant land records before the nonjudicial foreclosure procedure set out at ORS 
18 86.740 - ORS 86.755 may be invoked. ORS 86.735(1). 
19 c Ihe J\1ERS Corporation 
Again, that principle applies equally \vhen the promissory note is secured 
by a trust deed; the trust deed follows the note by operation of Imv. 
9 
MERS is a creature of the real es tat e finance industry. In the micl-l 990's, 
2 large players in the industry. including the Federal National ivfortgage Association 
3 (Fannie Mae) and the F eclernl Home Loan i\fortgage Co1voratio11 (Fred die !vfac }, decided 
ii to create a dntabase that would electronic() lly track ownership in secured real estate loans 
) as they were bought ancl sold in a secouclmy market. generally in packages now know n as 
6 mortgage-backed securities. R. K. Arnold, Yes, lhere is Life 0 11 MERS. 11 Prob & Prop 
7 33, 33-3L1 ( 1997). They created MERSCorp Holdings, a "111e111ber-lrnsed organiza tion 
8 made up of thousands o f lenders, serv icers. sub-servicers. investors and government 
9 institutions ." See k!ERSCORP Holdings, Inc., http://\V\NW.m ersinc.org/about-us/ foq 
10 (accessed l'vlay 22 , 201 3). T he primary product ofMERSCorp Holdings was and is the 
11 "MERS System," a "national electronic database that tracks changes in mortgage 
12 servicing: and beneficial ownership interests in loans secured by 1eside11tial rea l estate." 
13 id. 
14 B ut there is another s ignificant aspect of MERS; that entity serves as the 
l S designated mortgagee or beneficiary, as the nominee of the lender, for all mortgages and 
16 trust deeds registe red in the MERS Syste 111 . Id C hristopher L. Peterson, Foreclosw e, 
17 S11bprime /_ ending, ond the Alortgoge Electronic Registration S)·stem , 78 U C inci11I1a ti L 
18 Rev 1359, 136 1-62 (2009). MERS, however. does no t m ake, serv ice. or invest in loans. 
19 Id at 1371. 
20 D. The Tm st Deeds· nnd Plnint[ffs' Challenges 
2 1 The cert ified questions that m e before this cou rt arise out of fonr separat e 
2 2 actions challeng ing a trus tee's attempt to nonjudicially foreclose a trus t deed securing 
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residential property. In each case. homeo\v11ers (collectively. "plaintiffs") financed the 
purchase of a residence in Oregon with a loan from a lender that is a member of MERS. 
In each case. the homeowners signed ( 1) a promissory note pledging to repay the money 
borrowed. plus interest. according to a prescribed schedule and by a specified date, and 
(2) a "Deed of Trust." granting to a named trustee the property they had purchased with 
the loan. "i11 trust. with pcnver of sale," to secure the payment of the prornissory note and 
other related promises. 
Except for the names and property descriptions. the trust deeds iu the four 
cases are identical. In a "definition" section. each trust deed identifies the "Borrower." 
"Lender" and "Trustee" by name, and then sets 0111 the following definition of "MERS": 
"':rvfERS' is Ivfortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. !VIERS is 
a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and 
Le11der's successors and assigns. tv!ERS is the beneficiary under this 
Security Instrument." 
In a section entitled "Transfer of Rights in the Property." the trust deed states: 
"The bene.flcimy of this Securiry Instrument is AfERS ('wlely as 
nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) and the 
successors and assigns of AfER5'. 771is Security Instrument secures to 
Lender: (i) the repayment c~f the Loan, ond oil renewals, extensions and 
modiflcarions l~f the Note, and (ii) the pe1forma11ce <~/Borrower's covemmts 
and agreeme11rs um/er rhis Security l11stn11nenf and the Note. For this 
purpose. Borro\Ner irrevocably grants and conveys to Trustee. in trust.. with 
power of sale. the following described property* * * . [t]ogether with all 
the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all 
easements. appurtenances. and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the 
property. All replacements and additions shall also be covered by this 
Security Instrnme11t. All of the foregoing is referred to in this Security 
Instrnment as the Property. Borrmver understands and agrees that AIERS 
holds on/v leool title lo the inreres/s oranted bi· Borrmver in this Securilr 
.,, ~".:! <.'"::> "' •' 
!11stn1111enr, but, if·necessm:l' to comp(v with low or cusrom, 1'IER5' (as 
nominee for Le11der and Le11der 1s successors ond assigns) has the right: to 
I l 
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11 
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exercise 011y or ol/ of those interests, incl11ding, but not limited to, the right 
to foreclose and sell the Property, and to take any action required of 
Lender including, bur not lilnired to, releasing and canceling rhis Sec11rity 
lnsrrumenf. 
(Emphases added.) 
Those provisions appear to turn the traditional three-party trust deed 
arrangement -- debtor/grantor, trnstee, and lender/beneficiary -- into a four-party 
arrangement_ with the functional role of the beneficiary being split between two entities. 
Although the benefit of the trust deed is reserved to the "Lender" (because the trust deed 
"secures to the Lender" the obligations of repayment and performance of other 
covenants), M ERS purport s to be the beneficiary "as nominee for Lender and Lender' s 
successors and assigns ." 
-.. 
Plaintiffs in all four cases signed the promissory notes and trust deeds as 
described. amL aft er a period of years, allegedly defa11lted on their loans. Following. each 
default, rvIERS executed a written assignment of the trust deed to the reputed ultimate 
successor in interest of the orig inal lender and recorded that ass ignment in the pertinent 
real property records. Each of those assignees then appoi11ted a new trnstee. ReconTrns t 
Company.NJ\ .. and that assignment also was recorded. Thereafter, Reco11Trust as 
trnstee. commenced the process of nonjudicial foreclosure u11der each trnst deed, iss11i11g 
,.., 
no tices of tlte grantor's default and the tn1stee's election to sell. 
In a ll four cases. plainti ffs brought a11 action in state court aga ins t 
ReconTrnst, rvfERS, and the reput ed ultimate successor in interest of their orig inal lender, 
seeki11p. to enjoin tlte nonjudic ial foreclosure proceedi11g on a mnnber of grounds. 
12 
including that (I) a condition for nonjudicial foreclosure had not been satisfied --
2 specifically, the requirement in ORS 86. 735( I) that any assignments of the trust deed by 
3 the "beneficiary" be publicly recorded in the pe11inent real property records; and (2) 
4 MERS's purp011ed assignment of the trust deed to the reputed ultimate successor in 
S interest was ineffective. because, at the time of the purported assignment "the principal 
6 f()r whom l\fERS pmported to act as 'beneficiary' did not hold plaintiff's loan at that 
7 date." Defendants removed the cases to federal court. and then filed motions to dismiss 
8 under FRCP 12 (b)(6). arguing. that MERS was the lawful beneficiary under the trust 
9 deeds. that all assignments of the trust deeds by the named "beneficiary." IvIERS. had 
IO been recorded, and that ORS 86. 735( 1) did not require assignments of the trnst deeds by 
l l the lenders to be recorded. The federal district court certified the questions set out above 
12 to this court. \.Ve consider the questions in order. 
13 II. FIRST CERTIFIED QUESTION 
14 "May an entity. such as :tvfERS, that is neither a lender nor successor 
1 S to a lender, be a 'beneficiary' as that term is used in the Oregon Trust Deed 
16 Act?" 
17 This question is one of statutory construction. which we approach using the 
18 methodolo_gy described in Srore v. Gaines, ::H6 Or 160. 206 P3cl I ()112 (2009). We focus 
19 first 011 the text, coutext, and any legislative history brought to our atteution by the parties 
20 that we find useful. and proceed to general maxims of statutory construction if the 
21 legislature's intent remains obscure. Id. ar 171-72. The pertinent text the definition of 
22 "beneficiary" that appears in ORS 86. 705: 
"As used in ORS 86. 705 to 86. 795 [that is, the Ore_gon Trust Deed 
13 
Act]: 
2 "* * * * * 
3 "(2) 'Beneficiary' means a person named or otherwise designated in a 
4 trust deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or the 
5 person's successor in interest and who is not the trustee unless the 
6 beneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under ORS 86. 790(1 )(cl)." 3 
7 There is no dispute about the meaning of the last clause. Rather, the parties square off 
8 over the meaning of the requirements that the person (I) be "named or otherwise 
9 designated in [theJ trust deecL" (2) "as the person for whose benefit the trust deed is 
10 given° Taking the latter phrase first. the "benefit" of a trust deed is the security it 
11 provides with respect to an obligation owed by the grantor to the beneficiary. That is 
12 made clear in many of the surrounding statutes. For example, as notecC the term "trust 
13 deed" is defined as "a deed exec11tecl in conformity with ORS 86.705 to 86. 795 that 
14 conveys au interest i11 real property to a trnstee in trust to secure the pe1formonce of an 
IS obligation the grrmtor or other person named in the deed owes to a beneficiary." ORS 
We use the current version of the statute. \Vhich is numbered differently but 
does not othenvise vary materially from the version in effect when the pariies signed the 
trust deeds. That version, ORS 86.705 (2005). provided: 
"As Hsed in ORS 86.705 - 86.795, unless the context requires 
or hen vise: 
"( l) 'Beneficiary' means the person named or otherwise designated 
iu a trust deed as the person for whose beuerit a trust deed is ?iven, or the 
person's successor in interest. aud who shnll 1101 be the trustee unless the 
beneficiary is qualified to be a trnstee under ORS 86. 790(1 )(d)." 
(Differences in italics.) 
14 
86. 705(7) (emplrnsis added). Similarly, "gnmlor" is defined as "the person that conveys 
2 an interest in real property by a trust deed as securityjcJr the pe1for111ance 0/011 
3 obligation." ORS 86.705(4) (emphasis added). Finally, ORS 86.710, which genern lly 
4 describes the power of a trustee to no11judicially foreclose, begins with a genern l 
) description of a trust deed: "Transfers in trust of an interest in real property may be made 
6 10 secure the p e1:fon11011ce (~f rm obligation r~fa g rr111tor. or any other person named in the 
7 deed, 10 o beneficim:r." (Emphasis added.) Thus, tlie person "for \vhose benefit the trust 
8 deed is given" is the person to whom the grantor owes an obligation. the performance of 
9 which the trust deed secures. 
10 That analysis, hovvever, speaks only to the second hal f of the wording or 
I 1 the definition. Plaintiffs suggest that the initial phrase "tl1e person uarned or otherwise 
12 desiguated as" means that the trust deed must ide11tifY (name or otherwise designate) the 
13 persou who meets the definition of "beneficiary" as that term is used in the statute. 
14 Defendants contend, to the contrary, that the legislature used that phrase to signify that 
15 that the parties to the trust deed could agree to "name" or "designate" whomever they 
16 chose to serve "as" beneficiary -- and that , for pmposes of ORS 86. 705(2), the 
I 7 "beneficiary" would be the person so desipiated. Thus. as uefendants conceive it , 
18 clesig.rn1tion of a beneficiary is purely a matter of contract. Plaintiffs' contrary 
19 interpretat ion. defendants assert, essentially turns the initial phrase of the defi11ition into 
20 surplusage, violating a fundamental principle of statutory construction set out at ORS 
2 1 17:1.0 IO: that is, " 110 1 * * * to omit what has been inserted ." 
22 We do not agree that plainti ffs' reading removes the phrase "1rnmed or 
15 
otherwise designated as" from the statute. As noted above, plaintiffs read the statutory 
2 definition as providing that, in addition to being the person "for whose benefit the trnst 
3 deed is given," the beneficiary must be "named or otherwise designated" as such in rhe 
4 rmst deed. That reading uses all of the words of the statute. Indeed. we find plaintiffs' 
5 reading of the definition to be more compelling. on a purely textunl level. than 
6 defendauts'. If defendant's reading were correct. then anyone -- even a persou with no 
7 connection to or interest in the transaction at all -- could be designated in the agreement. 
8 If the legislature had intended "beneficiary" to have the circular meaning that defendants 
9 suggest -- that "beneficiary" means \Vhomever the trust deed names as the "beneficiary" --
I 0 it would have had no reason to include any description or the beneficiary's functional role 
11 in the trust arrangement The fact that the statute does include such a description ("the 
12 person for whose benefit the trust deed is given") strongly suggests that the legislature 
I 3 intended to define "beneficiar[ies]'' by their functional role. 11ot their clesig11ation. Stated 
14 differently. by including such a functional description. it is apparent that the legislature 
15 intended that the beneficiary of the trust deed be the person to whom the obligation that 
l 6 the trust deed secmes is owed. 
17 As discussed. in a typical resiclcutial trust deed trausactiou. the obligation 
18 secured by the trust deed is memorialized in a pronussory note that contains a borrower's 
19 promise to repay a home loan to a lender. At inception. the lender is the person who is 
20 entitled to repayment of the note and. thus, functionally is "the person for \vhose benefit 
2 l the trust deed is given." That person's "sllccessor in interest" whom ORS 86. 705(2) also 
22 recognizes as a beneficiary. is a person \Vho succeeds to the lender's rights. 
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Defendants contend that another provision of the OTDA ORS 86. 720(3), 
undermines that construction of ORS 86. 705(2). ORS 86. 720 addresses the circumstance 
in which the obligation secured by a trust deed has been satisfied, but either the 
beneficim)' or trustee has foiled or refused to release the trust deed. In such a 
circumstance. where a tit le insurance company or insurance producer has satisfied the 
obligation thro11gh an escrow, ORS 86. 720(1) authorizes the insurer. in a backup role. to 
issue and record a release of the trnst deed to clear title. In that context. ORS 86.720(3) 
provides: 
"Prior to the issuance and recording of a release [of the lien upon 
perfrmnance of the obligation secured by the trust deed], the title insurance 
con1pany or insmance producer shall give notice of the intention to record a 
release of tmst deed to the beneflcimy of record and, ifdifferen!, the party 
to 1vhom the.fir!/ satisfaction was made." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Defendants assert that the emphasized text shows that the legislature 
understood that the "beneficiary" need not be the lender or the lender's successor in 
interest. \Ve do not agree that the statutory text necessarily -- or even probably -- bears 
such a construction. It is equally. if not more plausible. to conclude that the phrase "if 
different. the party to whom the full satisfaction \Vas rnade." was meant mstead to 
acknowledge the circumstance where a lender's successor in iuterest is not the 
beneficiary "of recorcL" but is entitled to repayment of the underlying obligation. 
Ironically. that is precisely the circumstance that defendants assert permissibly occurred 
in these cases and that is the subject of the third certified question discussed belmv. 
When the statute is viewed in that ligJ1L it reinforces the conclusion that the beneficiary is 
17 
the lender or the lender's successor in interest. In short, ORS 86.720(3) docs not furnish 
2 persuasive context that supports defendants' proposed meaning of the term "beneficiary" 
3 under the OTDA. 
4 Defendants next contend that the statutory mem1ing of "beneficiary" must 
5 be interpreted in the context of common lavv principles of agency. freedom of contracL 
6 and coJ11mercial law Defendants point to case law showing that Oregon recognizes that 
7 an agent, even one without a pecuniary interest. may engage in land transactions and hold 
8 title on behalf of <l principal. See, e.g. Halleck,._ Halleck et of.. 216 Or 23. 38. 33 7 P2d 
9 330 ( 1959) ("'Conveyances of lands * * * may be made b.Y deed. signed by the person * * 
10 *or by his lawful agent'") (quotingj(mner ORS 93.010)); Bowns v. Bowns. 184 Or 603, 
1 I 613. 200 P2d 586 ( 19,18) (estate or interest in real property may be transferred by one's 
12 "'lawful agent. under \vritten authority"') (q11otingj(m11er ORS 93.020)); Kern 1· 
I 3 Howling. 27 Or 205. 207. 40 P 168 (1895) (note aml mortgage executed to member of 
14 brokerage firm as agent for principal). 1 Defendants also point to the "bedrock" principle 
15 that "contracts. when entered into freely and voluntarily. shall be held sacred and shall be 
16 enforced by courts." unless contrary to soI11e "overpoweriug rule of pllblic policy." 
17 McDonnol ond AfcDonnal. 293 Or 772, 779. 652 P2d 12,17 (1982) (quoting Feves v. 
18 Feves. 198 Or 151. 159-60, 25!1P2d694 (1953)). Defendants assert that proper 
Defendants also cite a federal case, In re Cllshmon Bnke1:v. 526 F2d 23, 30 
(1st Cir 1975) cer! den. 425 US 937 (1976) for the proposition that a lien may be 
recorded in the name of a nominee. 
18 
consideration of those common l(jw principles in iuterpreting the trust deed statutes 
2 supports their reading that ORS 86.735(1) allmvs someone other tlrnn an obligee to be the 
3 "beneficiary," either because the parties have freely and voluntarily agreed to designate 
4 someone else as the beneficiary or because the obligee has chosen to have someone CICI as 
5 its agent or nominee. Ivfore specifically -- although the premise is implicit -- the core of 
6 defendants' "freedom of contract" argument appears to be that. although J'vlERS has no 
7 right to repayment of the notes in these cases. it uevertheless may be designated by 
8 contract as the beneficiary for other functions. in particular those functions relating to the 
9 control of the foreclosure process. 
10 We disagree. The resolution of this question does not hinge on the parties' 
11 intent: rather, it depends on legislative intent. That is. the OTDA authorizes nonjudicial 
12 foreclosure only when certain statutory requirements are met. In these circumstances. the 
13 rneaning of "beneficiary," as used in ORS 86. 735(1 ), is deten11i11ed by statute, and that 
14 meaning is incorporated into, and cannot be altered by, the party's agreement. See, e.g. 
l S Ocean A. & G. Corp., Ltd v. Albina 1\1 I fVks., 122 Or 615, 617. 260 P 229 (1927) ("law 
16 of the land applicable thereto is a part of every valid contract"): see also. R. Lord, l l 
17 lVil/isron on Contracrs § 30:2:1 (ilth eel 1999) ("[i]ncorporation of cxislm?, law may act to 
18 supersede inconsistent clauses purporting to define the terms oft he agreement. For 
19 instance, where a statute regulates the amount the government is to pay for a particular 
20 service. the statute controls despite a contract between the govermnent and the provider 
21 of the service agreeing to a lower rate."). If the legislature had intended lo make the 
22 parties' agreemeut paramount over the statute in this regard, it could have. and likely 
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would have. included an "unless otherwise <lgrecd" caveat, as it has in some statutes. See, 
2 e.g. . ORS 72.3070 ("Unless or hen vise agreed. all goods called for by a contract for sale 
3 must be tendered in a single delivery * * *. "). But, in light of the structure of the OTDA, 
4 it is unsurpris ing that it did not do so. 
5 The OTDA contemplntes a unitary beneficiary sta tus. so that the person 
6 wit II the right to repayment of the Ullderlyi ng obligatio11 <llso controls the roreclosure 
7 process. The interact ion of a number of statutory provisions demoustrates the point. For 
8 example, ORS 86. 7 10 g ives the bene/lcimy the pO\ver to decide whether to foreclose 
9 judicially 01 no11juclicially. Under ORS 86.720. the beneficimy must request 
10 reconvcym1cc alier the seemed obligation is sntislied. ORS 86.737(2)(b)(B) provides that 
11 notice to the grant or o f a foreclosure sale 1.nust include "a te lephone number that will 
12 allow the grnutor access during regular business lloms lo person-to-person consultatio11 
13 with an individual authorized by the beneficiary to discuss the grantor's payment and loan 
14 term negotiation and modification ." In addition, under ORS 86.745(1), a notice of sale 
1.5 mnst include the name of the "beneficiary ." ORS 86.753(1) provides that the g,rantor 
16 (and others) may cure a defaull before a foreclosure sale by making payment. and payinµ 
17 costs aud exprnses "to the beneficiary_" ORS 86.759(5) provides that sta tutory 
18 requirements that the trustee provide de fault and cure-related information to the grantor 
19 and others "do not affect the duty o f beneficiaries to provide information to g rantors ." 
2 0 Aud. significantl y. it is the benefic iary alone who has authori ty to appoint a successor 
2 1 trustee. ORS 86. 790(3). !11 sum. the integrated effect of those provis ions presumes that 
22 the collective rights and obligations that de fine bene fic iary status are functionally united: 
20 
that is. the person entitled to repayment of the secured obligation also controls the 
2 foreclosure process. 
3 That functional unity has longstanding roots in the common law itself A 
4 flindamental principle in mortgage law holds that a foreclosing party must have the 
5 power to enforce the underlying note. See United Srotes Not. Bank v. Holton, 99 Or 419. 
6 /129, 195 P 823 ( 1921) ("It has ahvays been the l;nv of this state that the assignment of the 
7 note carries the mortgage * * * The assignment of a mortgage independent of the debt 
8 which it is given to secure, is au umneaning ceremony."). That concern underlies the 
9 standard doctrine in judicial foreclosure proceedings that the foreclosing party must 
IO provide proof that it has the power to enforce the note. See genera/Zr Alan l'vL White, 
11 Losing the Paper -- J\fortgage Assignments, Note ha11sfers and Consmner Protection. 24 
12 Loy Consumer L Rev 468, 4 76-77 (2012) (collecting cases). 
13 Neither can the statutory meaning of "beneficiary" yield to an obligee's 
14 decision to use another party as its agent or nominee. Although the cases and statutes 
1 S cited by defendants shmv that a lawful agent can have broad authority to act on a trust 
16 deed beneficiary's behalf in regard to the exercise of ri,eJ1ts under the trust deed. even to 
17 the point of appearing on documents in the beneficiary's stead. the agent cannot become 
18 the "beneficiary" for purposes of a statutory requirement that is defined. in part by the 
19 status of the "beneficiary." To reinforce the point. the legislature. in recent amendments 
20 to the OTDA, has plainly distinguished bet\veen a beneficiary and its agents in the 
21 nonjudicial foreclosure context. See. e.g.. ORS 86. 735(<1) (reqlliring either "the 
22 beneficiary or the beneficiary's agent" to certify compliance with statutory requirements 
21 
as a co11dition of 11onjndicial forcclosnre) .-~ Herc, the "beneficiary" to which ORS 
2 86. 73 5( I) refers must be ''the person for whose benefit the trust deed [·was] given," that is 
3 (as discussed), the person to whom the obligation that the trust deed secures is owed or 
4 that person's successor in interest Dy the terms of the trust deeds at issue in these cases, 
5 those persons me the lenders ("[t]his Security Instrnrnent secures to Lender: (i) the 
6 repayment or the Loan") or their successors. Unless the lenders have transferred such 
7 interests to their agent s or nominees, the latter persons cannot become "benefi ciaries" for 
8 purposes of the OTDA. 6 7 
9 Iu sum, our answer to the first question certified by the district comt is as 
I 0 follows : for purposes of ORS 86. 735( I). the "beneficiary" is the lender to whom the 
I I obligation that the trust deed secm es is owed or the lender 's successor i11 i11terest. Thus, 
12 an entity like tvJERS. which is not a lender, may not be a trust deed's "benefic iary, " unless 
13 it is a lender ' s successor in i11terest. 
The 20 12 legis lature s ignificantly a111ernled the OTDA. The quoted 
wording from OR S 86. 735(4) was one or the amendments. Or L:nvs 20 12, ch 112, § G. 
6 We di scuss defendants' other arguments pertaining to the lmv of agency, 
includi11g their argument thal l'vlERS, as the lender's "uomiuee." may hold "legal title" to 
the lender's rights under the trust deed, in om answer to the fourth certified question . 
Defendant s also argue that the legislative history of the OTDA supports 
the ir interpreta tion of the sta tute and have included portions of the legis lative history in 
s11pport of that ciC1i111 . Defendants' theory is that, insofar as the legis lative history 
discloses that the legislature's general purpose in enacting the OTDA w<ls to provide a 
simpler and more economica l method of foreclosure to attract more lenders to Oregon, an 
interpretation that permits the parties to contractually appoint a beneficiary \vould 
advance that purpose. We do not find the proffered hi story. or defendant s' theory of it s 
relevance, to be helpful, and do not discuss it Ji.1rtlter. 
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UL SECOND CERTIFIED QUESTION 
":Wfay 1vIERS be designated as beneficiary under the Oregon Trust 
Deed Act where the trust deed provides that MERS 'holds only legal title to 
the interests granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument_ but, if 
necessary to comply vvith law or custom, ~JER.S (as nominee fl1r Lender 
and Lender's successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of 
those interests'?" 
This question goes to defendants' theory that, under the OTDA, l'v1ERS is 
elif',ible to serve as "beneficiary" of a trust deed m a role as the oblif',ee's agent or 
nominee. The theory behind the question is: If ORS 86. 705(2). in fact, defines 
"beneficiary" in terms of a beneficiary's function in the trust arrangen1ent, which function 
is definecL in tum, by the beneficiary's rights that are secured by the trust deed, then an 
agent or nominee \Vho has been delegated sufficient rights should qualify as n beneficiary 
under the statute. Defendants contend that the obligees that MERS serves. as agent or 
nominee. have delef',ated to fv!ERS sufficient rights for that purpose. Because the more 
precise question is whether MERS is eligible to serve as a beneficiary under the OTDA. 
not whether it may be "designated" as such, 'Ne amend the certified question and nns\ver 
it accordinf',ly. 
Defendants arg11e. first. that by defining MERS as the beneficiary "acting 
solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns." the trust deeds in 
these cnses clearly convey an intention that l'v1ERS act as the lender's or its successors' 
agent. Defendnnts nlso contend thnt Iv!ERS's agreement with its members explicitly 
Provides tlrnt ~IERS \Vill serve as the 1nembers' common agent -- allowing MERS to act ~- ~ 
as agent or nominee for the initial lemler and any successors in iJ1terest who are members 
of J'vfERS. s Finally. defendants poiut to \Vording in the trust deeds that purports to 
2 authorize .ivIERS to exercise all of the lender's rights under the trust deeds: 
3 "Borrower understands and agrees that l'vIERS holds only legal title to the 
4 interests granted by BoITower in this Security Instrument bur, (/necessmy 
5 to comp(l' with law or c11stom, AfERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender's 
6 successors ond assigns) hos the right: to exercise any or o!l o.l those 
7 interests, including, but not limited to, the right ro foreclose and se!l the 
8 Property, and to take ony action required ofLender including, b111 no/ 
9 limited lo, releasing and canceling this Securiry lnstmment." 
l 0 Defendants argue that if J\fERS, as the obligee's nominee. must have some or all of the 
I I obligee's rights to qnalit)' as the trnst deed beneficiary for purposes of ORS 86. 705(3). 
12 then the broad delegation of pm.ver to l'vfERS contained in the quoted provisiou would be 
13 sufficient to make I'vIERS eligble to serve as the "beneficiary." 
14 It is unspoken. but evident, that the necessity to which the above provision 
15 refers is the necessity of haviug IvfERS be recognized as the trust deed beneficiary for 
16 purposes of any requirement that must be satisfied before the trust deed may be 
l 7 nonjnclicially foreclosed. That the provision imbues the \Vorel "necessary" with an 
18 unnatural meaning, with the result that the provision is circular, does not render the 
The rv1ERS membership agreement is not in the record. but 1v1ERS asserts, 
in its brief to this court. that the agreement provides that "J\.JERS shall at all times comply 
with the instruction of the beneficial owner of mortgage loans." and that it grants J\lERS 
authority to "execute important documents, foreclose and take all other actions necessary 
to protect the interests of the noteholder." Defendants also note that other courts have 
determined, in cases in which the MERS membership agreement wos placed in tlte 
record, that the agreement spells out MERS's duties to its members in those terms. 
Neither defendants' bare assertions nor the cases cited provide a basis for this court to 
determine what the agreements actually provide in the cases before the district court. 
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provision unenforceable. as plaintiffs seem to suggest. We accept the provision in the 
2 way it apparently was intended: It is triggered by any apparent deficiency iu 1'vIERS's 
3 authority to serve as beneficiary. aucl, according to defendants' theory. results in the 
4 delegation to I'vIERS of any of the obligee's rights or interests that IvIERS might be 
5 required to have for that purpose. 
6 The problem with defendants' theory. however, is that. while asserting 
7 l'vlERS's authority to exercise oil of the obligee's rights and interests. the provision fails 
8 to speak to the one interest that an entity must have to qualify as a beneficiary under ORS 
9 86. 705(2). As discussed above. Or at (slip op at 22). the beneficiary under that 
I 0 definition is the person to \Vhorn the obligation that the trust deed secures is owed. 
l l lJnless the "law or custom" provision transforms IvfERS into such an obligee. it cannot 
12 transform I'v1ERS into the "beneficiary" of the trust deed. 
13 And it is clear that the "law or custom" provision does not have that legal 
14 effect. The provision first states that tvIERS holds "only legal title to the interests granted 
15 by Borroiver in this Security Instrument." \Vhen the provision thereafter states that 
16 !VIERS has the right "to exercise any or all of those interests," if 11ecessary to comply with 
17 law or custom, it refers lo the mterests "granted by the borrower in this security 
18 instrument." But the interests that are granted by the grnntor in a trust deed are different 
19 from the right to repayment under a related promissory note. As discussed above, ___ Or 
20 at (slip op at 6). the grautor conveys two interests by signing a trnst deed: to the 
2 I trustee. a legal interest in the snbject real property. \:vhich may be foreclosed upon the 
22 obligor ' s default on the 1111derlying obligation: and to the beneficiary. the beneficial 
25 
counterpart to tlrnt legal interest. ln each of the four trust deeds that are at issue, the first 
2 (legal) interest is conveyed in the following sentence in tlre "Transfer of Rights in the 
3 Pro1)ertyu provision: "Bo1To\ver irrevocably~ grants and conveys to T'rustee~ in trust.. \Vith 
4 power of sale, the following described property." That the lender obtnins the benefit of 
:'i the legal interest that is granted to the trustee is conveyed in the preceding sentence: 
6 "This Security Instrmnent sec11res to Lender: (i) the repayrnent of the Loan, 
7 alld all renewals. extensions and rnodirications of the Note. and (ii) the 
8 performance or Borrmver's covenants and agreements under this Security 
9 Instrument and the Note." 
10 Tims, the interests and rights that were "granted by the borrower under this security 
I l instrument" were only ( l) a legal interest in the property that the trust deed burdens. in 
12 the form of a lien: and (2) an equitable or beneficial interest in that lien. 
13 In contrast, in these cases, the interest in the secured obligation that a party 
14 must have to qualify as the trust deed's "beneficiary" -- the obligation that the trnst deed 
I :'i secures -- is the right to repayment of the obligation. Although rela1ed to the above-
16 mentioned interests that are granted in the trust deed by the grantor, that right to 
I 7 repayment is not one of those interests. That is , the obligee's right to repayment is 
18 sec11red by the lien on the property that the grantor grants iu the trust deed, but that right 
19 exists apart from the trust deed and is not "granted by the borrower in the [trust deed].'' It 
20 fr)Ilows that, even if the "law or custom" clause \Vere triggered so that the right to 
2 l exercise "any or all" interests granted in the trust deed by the borrower was delegated to 
22 !vfERS, .lvIERS still would not have an interest that would qualify it as the trust deed's 
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beneficiary. 9 
2 To conclude: A "beneficiary" for purposes of the OTDA is the person to 
3 whom the obligation that the trust deed secures is owed. At the time of origination, that 
4 person is the lender. The trust deeds in these cases designate the lender as the 
5 beneficiary, when they provide: "This Security Instrument secures to Lender: (i) the 
6 repay111ent oft he loan. and all renewals, extensions and modifications of the note: and (ii) 
7 the perfonnance of borrower's covenants and agreements under this security instrument 
8 and the note." Because the provision that I'vIERS "holds only legal title to the interests 
9 granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument. but if necessary to comply with law or 
IO custom, iVlERS ***has the right to exercise any or all of those interests," docs not 
11 convey to MERS the beneficial right to repayment of the secured obligation, the inclusion 
12 of that provision does not alter the trnst deed's designation of the lender as the 
l 3 "beneficiary" or make MERS eligible to serve in that capacity. 
14 IV. THIRD CERTIFIED QUESTION 
15 "Does the transfer of a promissory note from the lender to a 
16 successor result in an automatic assignment of the securing trust deed that 
17 must be recorded prior to the commencement of nonjudicial foreclosure 
18 proceedings under ORS 86.735(1)')" 
9 Moreover. the "law or custom" provision purports to delegate to I\lERS the 
right "to exercise" any of the interests granted in the trust deed by the grant or: it does not 
purport to actually convey those interests to I'vJERS. Given that the OTDA defines 
"beneficiary" in terms of an interest that the beneficiary hos (the right to payment that the 
trust deed secures), and not in terms of the interests that the beneficiary docs or may 
exercise, it is doubtful that couvcying to MERS a right "to exercise" the beneficiary's 
interest could bring I'v1ERS within the statutory definition. 
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l As \Ve already have mentioned. Or at (slip op at 8-9). Oregon law 
2 provides that the transfer of a promissory note that is secured by a mortgage 
3 automatically effects. by operation of law, an assignment of the mortgage. Because a 
4 trust deed is a species of mortgage and is "subject to all lmvs relating to mortgages 011 real 
.'.'i properly," ORS 86. 715, the same principle applies to trust deeds: A trnst deed follmvs 
6 the prmnissory note that it secures. The third certified question thus asks whether snch 
7 assignments by operation of law are included in the statutory requirement of ORS 
8 86.735(1) that "any assignments of the trust deed by the*** beneficiary*** [be] 
9 recorded" in the pertinent real property records. If the answer to that question is "yes," 
l 0 then the fact that the promissory notes have been transferred without corresponding 
11 recorded assignments of the trust deeds \Vould stand as a bar to nonjudicial foreclosure 
12 under ORS 86. 735 in the cases before the federal com!. Defendants argue. limveveL that 
13 the term "assignments," as used in ORS 86. 735( l ). refers only to assignments of a trust 
14 deed that are memorialized in a writing other than a writing that may serve to transfer the 
1 .'.'i promissory note. Therefore. as defenclauts argue, the statute does not require that 
16 assif1.I11Hents that result from the transfer of a promissory note be recorded before a 
I 7 nonjudicial foreclosure can proceed. The issue is (again) one of statutory construction, 
18 this time focusing on the meaning of the phrase "any assignments" in ORS 86.735(1). 
19 The text is not conclusive. Although the term "assignment" may carry a 
20 connotation of a \Vritten transfer of the trust deed itself. it appears to be broad enough to 
21 encompass any manner of transfer of the trust deed. such as by opernt ion oflmv. The 
22 first definition of the \Von! "assign" that appears in TVebster's Third /1/ew Int'! Dictionm:v 
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132 (11nabridged eel 2002) reflects the narrow connotation: "to transfer to another in 
2 writing.'' However, other definitions that appear in IJ'ebster's. and those that appear in 
3 Black~s· L<nv Dictionat)\ do 11ot refer to a \Vriting. In an_y event the notion that a securit)'r 
4 interest may be transferred by operation of law has a long and unchallenged history in 
5 this state. and the word "assignment" at times has been used by this court in connection 
6 with that concept. See, e.g. First Notionol Bk r. Jack Afathis Gen. Cont., 27cl Or 3 l:'i, 
7 32 L 546 P2d 754 ( 1976) ("assigmnent of a debt carries \Vi th it the security for the debt"): 
8 1Vi//omelte Col. & Credit Sen· .. 157 Or at 81-82 (using term "assignment" to refer to 
9 "mortgage follows the note" priuciplc): Barringer. LP Or at 229 (in euacting statute. 
I 0 legislature "recognize I edj the right * * * to assign [a mortgageJ by indorsernent of the 
11 note"). In short. the choice of the \Vord "assignments" in ORS 86. 735( I) does not negate 
12 the possibility that the legislatttre intended to include transfers of trust deeds that occur by 
l 3 operation of lmv. without a separate writing. 
14 The use of the expansive modifier "any" ("any assignments") is similarly 
15 inconclusive. Although it might convey a specific legislative intent that any manner of 
16 assignments, including those that occur by operation of law. be included in the 
1 7 recordation requirement. it also might simply refer to eve1:r "assignment" within the 
18 intended (possibly narrmver) meaning of that term. 
19 The parties also debate the import of statutes related to ORS 86.735(1) that 
20 have been offered as context for interpreting that statute. Among others. they point to 
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ORS 86.1 I O(J ). which \Vas in effect \Vhen the OTDA was enacted, 10 and which pertains 
2 to the discharge of record of a mortgage: 
3 "( l) \Vhenever a prmnissory note secured by mortgage on real 
4 property is lron~(erred by indorsement withol{/ oj(Jrmol assignmenr of the 
5 mortgage. and the mortgage is recorded, the mortgage, upon payment of the 
6 promissory note, may be discharged of record by the owner and holder of 
7 the promissory note making and filing with the appropriate recording 
8 officer a certificate*** proving the satisfaction of the mortgage.*** that 
9 the owner and holder is the owner and holder of the note. * * * and that the 
I 0 note has been fully paid and proving that fact to the satisfaction of the 
11 recordiug officer.'' 
12 (Emphasis added.) Defendants contend that the emphasized 'vvording shmvs that, 
13 although this comt's cases speak of a trnnsfer of a secured note by inclorsernent as 
14 assigning an associated mortgage by operation of law, the legislature has dnm·11 a 
15 distinction betvveen such "trnnsfcrs" and "assignments" of the mortgage. ffowever. the 
16 emphasized wording could support au alternative inference -- that "formal assignment" is 
17 only one fon11 of "assignmenL" and that another occurs by operation of lmv when a note 
18 is transferred. 11 Because that alternative construction is at least as plausible as 
10 We set out the current version of ORS 86.110( I). which differs from the 
version that was i11 effect i11 1959 when ORS 86. 735( l) was adopted. The differences are 
slight and are not relevant to our analysis here. 
11 Defendants co11te11d that it is evident that the word "formal" in ORS 
86. 110( l) "was intended to have a meaning consistent with the requirements of ORS 
86.060, \vhich describes an 'assigumeut of mortgage' as an instnnnent 'executed and 
acknowledged with the same formality as required in deeds and mortgages of real 
property'" -- and that, as such, it cannot signal a legislative recognitio11 of "assignment" 
by iudorsemc11t of a note as an alternative to "fonnal assignment." !Iowever. because 
ORS 86.060 was euacted after ORS 86.110, defendants' argument about the legislative 
inte11tio11 behi11d the phrase "formal assignment'' is speculative. 
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dcfeudm1ts' construction. we conclude that ORS 86. l l 0( l) is of little contextual help in 
2 our inteqxetive endeavor. 
3 What does seem significant is that the recording requirement in ORS 
4 86.735 assumes the existence of an assignment in recordable form and that the transfer of 
5 a promissory note cannot serve that f11nct ion. Because a promissory note generally 
6 contai11s no description of rcnl property and docs not transfer. encumber, or othenvise 
7 affect the title to real property. it cannot be recorded in land title records. See ORS 
8 93 .600 (real property shall be described for recordation according to United States 
9 survey. or by lots. blocks. etc): ORS 93.610 (providing for separate records for recording 
I 0 deeds and mortgages and "all other real property interests"); ORS 93.630 (requiring index 
11 to the record of "deeds. mortgages. and all other real property interests"): ORS 205.130 
12 (county clerk shall have custody of records of deeds and mortgages of real property and 
13 record of all maps, plats. contracts. etc. "affecting the title to real property). Although it 
14 is trne that the parties to the transfer of a promissory nole can ahvays memorialize the 
15 transfer in a separate writing that is recordable. plaintiffs' reading of ORS 86.735(1) 
16 \Vould turn that prnclicc into a req11ireme11t. at least when nonjudicial foreclosure is 
17 co11lemplated. But ORS 86. 735( I) does not appear to express such a requirement and 
18 certain mortgage statutes that existed at the time ORS 86.735(1) was enacted. one of 
19 \Vhich bears a remarkable resemblance to ORS 86. 735( I). suggest that the legislature did 
20 not intend one. 
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Tliosc mortgage statutes. ORS 86 060 and former ORS 86.070 ( 1959). L' 
"'" .. •· 
2 were enacted together in 189 5, in apparent response to pronouncements by this court in 
3 Bamberger, 24 Or at 210-13. about the absence of any provision in Oregon law for the 
4 recording of assignments of mortgages. The first statnte. ORS 86.060. provides: 
5 "fv[ortgages rnay be assigned by an instnunent in vvriting. executed 
G and acknovvledgcd with the same formality as required iu deeds and 
7 mortgages of real property, and recorded in the records of mortgages of the 
8 county v,'11ere the land is situated." 
9 The second statute.j(m11er ORS 86.070 (I 959). provided: 
10 "Every assignment of mortgage sha II be recorded at full length. and 
11 a reference shall be made to the book and page containing such assignment 
12 upon the margin of record of the mortgage 0 
13 This court discussed the combined effect of those two statutes. at 
14 considerable length. in Barringer. In that case, l\/Ir. and .tv!rs. Barringer loaned money to 
I 5 Hayden. evidenced by a note aIId secured by a mortgage. the latter of which was 
16 rccorclecl. The BmTingers divorced, and rvfrs. Barringer received the note and mortgage 
l 7 as part of their divorce settlement. Later. Jvfr. Barringer executed an "assignment" of the 
18 mortgnge to Loder, but Barringer ref11sed to sign an affidavit verifying his claim that he 
19 had lost the note and mo11gage. Regardless. Loder recorded the assignment. convinced 
20 I Iayden to pay him Ilic full amount due under the loan, and then recorded a notice 
21 canceling the mortgage (which \Vas actually held by l\frs. Barringer). Mrs. Barringer 
11 later sued Loder to foreclose 011 the mortgage. Barringer. 47 Or at 224-26. Loder 
Former ORS 86.070(1959) \Vas repealed m 1965. Or Laws 1965, ch 252, § 
I. 
observed that l\ifr. Barringer's name appeared in tile recorcL am! he arguecL based 011 the 
2 two statutes quoted above. that he was entitled to rely solely 011 the record. In particular. 
3 Loder argued that the statutes required all assignments of mortgages to be made in the 
4 manner provided therein. and that a mortgage "[could] not be otherwise assigned or 
:'\ transferred than as by these section prescribed." ,17 Or at 228-
(i This court held. instead, that the first statute's use of the permissive \Vorel 
7 "may." with reference to an assignment by an instrument in writing. "recognize[ed] the 
8 right * * * to assign by indorsement of the note." Id at 229. The court then adclecl: 
9 "\Vhen it comes to the manner of recording the assignment the word 'shall' 
10 is used. \:Vliy use the \Vorel 'may' in one section and 'shall' in the succeeding 
I 1 one? The relationship indicates an intendment that there should be a 
12 distinction in their application in practice. * * * ,·lssignments in the method 
13 designated then could be made be.fore the sra111re as well as by assignment 
14 (~f the note, and the act simpZv prescribes that this may still be done by that 
I:'\ merhod, bur thm such assignmems shall be recorded in the manner pointed 
16 O//f. 11 
I 7 Id at 229-30 (emphasis added). Thus. even though.former ORS 86.070 required 
18 recordation of "every assignment of mortgage." and even though Barringer characterized 
19 i11dorse111c11t of a note as all "assig11me11t." only tliose assig.1m1Cnts described in ORS 
20 86 060 -- that is. assigm11e1Its by a \Vritten instrument with the fonualities of a deed or 
21 mortgage were required to be recorded. 
1 1 ORS 86.060 andfonner ORS 86.070 -- and Barringer -- \Vere the law in 
23 Oregon when the OTDA was enacted in I 959. It is reasonable to infer that the legislature 
2il had that statutory framework in mind when it enacted \Vording in ORS 86. 735(1) that 
25 requires "any assignments of the trust deed" to be recorded as a prerequisite to 
nonjudicial foreclosure. That inference leads to the co11clusion that. like the requirement 
2 informer ORS 86.070 ( 1959) that "every assignment of mortgage shall be recorclecL" the 
3 requirement in ORS 86. 735( I) that "any assigmnents" be record eel refers only to 
4 assignmeuts like those described in ORS 86.06(L which are "in \\Tiling. executed and 
5 acknowledged \Vi th the same formality as required ill deeds and mortgages of real 
6 property." Again. the same reasoning. logically applies to assig1u11cnts of trust deeds. 
7 which arc "subject to all lmvs relating to n1ortgagcs." ORS 86. 715 . 
8 The legislature may have intended to impose a difTerent rccorcling regime in 
9 the nonjudicial foreclosure context - to require. in that context alone. that a recordable 
10 instrurnent be executed and recorded to doctunent every transfer of a trust deed by 
11 indorscrnent of the associated promissory note. so that a bonower faced \Vi th nonjudicial 
12 foreclosure could determine whether the person givillg 1Iotice of foreclosure possessed 
13 the beneficial interest in the trust deed at issue and had the right to foreclose. However. 
14 the legislature did not clearly express that intent. \Vhen the legislature enacted the 
15 OTDA and required that "any assignments of the trust deed" be recorded. tile nearly 
16 idc11tical statute stating that jejvery assign111e11t of mortgage shall be recorded" required 
17 rccordation only of formal. written assigrnnc1Its. Barringer, ,,7 Or at 230;./onner ORS 
18 86.070 (1959). There is 11othi1Ig to indicate that. whell it enacted ORS 86.735(1). the 
19 legislature did not similarly intend for "assignments" of a trust deed to refer only to 
20 formal. written assignments oft he trust cleed, not transfers by indorsement oft he 
21 underlying debt instrwnent. By describing an "assignment of mortgage'' as a written 
22 instrument executed "with the salllc formality as required in deeds," ORS 86.060, and 
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then. in the immediately following section. requiring rccordation of "[eJvcry assignment 
2 * **at full leugth."j(mner ORS 86.070 (1950). it is apparent that the only "assignment" 
3 the 1959 legislature had in mind in enacting ORS 86. 735( 1) \Vas an assignrnent by a 
4 \Vritten instrument It follows that. for purposes of ORS 86. 735(1 ). ''ilssignments of the 
5 trust deed" meilns \Vritten Clssigmnents tlrnt are executed and acknowledged with such 
6 fonnalities. not a post hoc nwmorialization or a transfer or the secured obligation created 
7 solely for the purpose of recording. Thus. the auswer to the third certified question is 
8 "no." ORS 86.735(1) docs not require recorclation of "assignments" of the trust deed by 
9 operation of law that result from the transfer of the secured obligation. 
l 0 In giving that m1swer. we acknowledge a practical concern that appears to 
1 1 loom in the background of these cases -- that construing the phrase "any assignments" in 
12 ORS 86.735(1) as applying only to fonnaL written assig11n1cnts ofa trust deed renders the 
13 provisiou meaningless. In particular (the concern posits). a recording requirement that is 
11! so easily bypassed can have no conceivable function in the OTDA's statutory scheme: 
15 indeed. read in that \vay. the requirement precludes homeowners in frH·eclosure from 
16 ascertaining the identity of the trne beneficiary. That concenL however, rests on the 
17 mistaken assumption that the right of a dcfoulting homeowner to establish the identity of 
18 the true beneficiary depends excl11sively on plaintiffs' preferred reading of the recording 
19 requirement in ORS 86.735(1). 
20 To the contrary. the OTDA is laced with provisions that indicate that the 
21 12-rnntor is entitled to know the identity of the beneficrnry As discussed above, ORS 
22 86.753(1). for example, provides that the grantor (and others) may cure a default before a 
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foreclosure sale by making payment aml paying costs and expenses ''to the beneficiary." 
2 Under ORS 86. 73 7(2)(b)(B), notice to the grant or of a foreclosure sale must include "a 
3 telephone number that will allow the grantor access during regular business hours to 
4 person-to-person consultation with an individual aurhori::.ed by the beneficim:r to discuss 
5 the grantor's payment and loan term negotiation and modification." Similarly, under 
6 ORS 86.745( I), a uotice of sale must include the name of the "beneficiary-" Finally, 
7 ORS 86 759(5) provides that statutory requirements tliat the trustee provide default and 
8 cure-related infon11atio11 to the grantor and others "do not affect the duty of beneficiaries 
9 to provide information to grnntors." In sum, those provisious all assume that the true 
I 0 beneficiary must be identifiable. Thus, uo part of onr answer to the third certified 
1 1 question should be taken to suggest that. \Vhere the foreclosing party is not the original 
12 lender_ the foreclosing party need uot provide definitive docurne11tatio11 of its status as tile 
13 lender's successor in i11terest to establish its right to foreclose. 
14 For that same reason, the fourth certified question. relating to MERS's 
15 authority to act as an agent for a lender or a lender's successor in interest is impo11a11t. 
16 Although we have concluded that the leuder or its successors need not record 
l 7 assig11wc11ts of the trust deeds that occur by operation oflaw, the fact remains that when 
18 those persons fail to do so, they are vulnerable to challenges that may force them to 
l 9 judicially establish their interests and authority to act. lJ With that fou11clatio11 in place. 
J.l Depencliug 011 whet lier MERS is an agent of tlie initial lender and its 
successors in iuterest. one commentator has suggested that ivlERS call establish a 
36 
2 
3 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 I 
12 
13 
I :J 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
2if 
25 
we turn to the fourth certified question. 
V. FOUR.TH CERTIFIED QUESTION 
"Does the Oregon Trust Deed Act allow :tvfERS to retain and transfer 
legal title to a trust deed as nominee for the lender, after the note secured by 
the trust deed is transferred from the lender to a successor or series of 
st icccssors?" 
Plaintiffs assert: 
"The OTDA docs not allow MERS to retain or transfer legal title to 
a trnst deed after the promissory note is transferred from the original lender 
to a successor. This is because :tvIERS has no legal title to the interests 
conveyed under a trust deed and because once its principal has no legal 
interests under a trust deed, it may not act on behalf of that principal to do 
for itself what its principal could not do. Even if it had some claim of legal 
title to the trust deed document that would make l'vIERS nothing more than 
a document custodian. not a beneficiary with rights to assign. 
"In addition, even if the trust deeds could so111ehow be construed to 
convey legal title to l'v!ERS, such n conveyance would be expressly 
forbidden under the OTDA. As the only interest granted by the Borrower 
in the security mstrument is a lien on the land as security for the repayment 
on the obligation and that legal title is conveyed to the trustee who lwlds it 
in trust for the beneficiary, there is simply no interest for 1v1ERS to hold." 
Plaintiffs also assert that l\1ERS's powers as an agent arc derived fi:om and limited to 
those of its principal. Thus, plaintiffs argue, J\fERS has no pmver or authority to act as an 
agent of a priucipal thnt has divested itself or its interest i11 a trnst deed. 
Defendauts reply. first. that "legal aud equitable rights to property call be 
satisfactory chain of title "by recording a memorandum of the series of assignments from 
itself as an agent of the original lender to itself as an agent of each successive 
'· ... .... 
notcholdcr." Dunne, ,19 Willamette L Rev at 100-101. As explained in our answer to the 
fourth certified question below. these cases do not furnish an opportunity to decide 
whether such a course of action would effectively establish tile ultimate beneficiary's 
identity and right to proceed \Vith nonjudicial foreclosure. 
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separntecl ;u1d held by different parties" It follows , they assert. that the OTDA allows 
2 .tvlERS to hold legal ti tie to a trust deed as nominee for the lender, after the note secured 
3 by the trust deed is transferred from the lender to a successor or series of successors. 
ti Alternatively, defendants argue that J'vfERS has authority as an ageut of the original 
5 lender and its successors to execute any assignments required or convenient to fac ilitate 
6 the noujudicial foreclosure process. 
7 Because of the \Vay in which the parties liave preseuted their arguments 
8 with respect to the fourth certified question . it is useful to refrarne it in two p;irts. The 
9 first part of the question is: 
l 0 "Does the Oregon Trust Deed Act allow I'vfERS to hold and transfer 
11 leg.a l title to a trust deed as nominee for the lender, after the note secured by 
12 the trust deed is transferred from the lender to a successor or series of 
13 successors?" 
l ei The sccoucl part of the q11estion is : 
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"If the ans\,ver to the first part of the question is 'no! does l\1ERS 
nevertheless have authority as an agent for the original lender and its 
successors in interest to act on their behalves with respect to the nonjudicial 
foreclosure process?" 
For the reasons now explained. the answer to the first part of the question is 
As discusse(L a beueric iary's interes t 1111der a trnst deed is analogous to a 
mortgagee's iutercst under a mortgage. ORS 86. 715 . Further, a mortgage couveys no 
legal or equitable interest in fee or for li fe to the 11101tgagee, but merely creates a lie11 that 
constitutes security for the underlying obli gation and grants the mortgagee, upou the 
mortgagor's default the right to have the property sold to satisfy the obligation. See ORS 
86 .0 I O: Stout 1•. Von Zonte, I 09 Or 430 . . IJS-3 6, 219 P 80<1, 220 P 4 14 (I 923): Schlee/: 
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107 Or at 7•1-79: Ukase Inv. Co. v. Smith. 92 Or 337. 340, 181P7 (1919). Although no 
2 Oregon case has considered which parties hold legal and equitable interests in the lien 
3 embodied in a trust deed in the context of the OTDA. a trustee typically holds legal title 
4 to the subject of the trust and the beneficiary holds equitable title. "When a trnst is 
5 created. the legal title is vested in the trustee * * *. 'A trust irnphes f\VO estates. -- one 
6 legal. and tlic other equitable: it also implies that the legal title is held by one person. the 
7 trustee. w!Jilc another person, the cestui que trust [the beneficimyJ. has the beneficial 
8 interest."' Jlorse er al. v. Pmt!son et al. 182 Or 111, 11 7. 186 P2d 394 (I 9-17) (quoting 
9 Allen v. Hendrick. 104 Or 202. 223, 206 P 733 (1922)) (emphasis added). ORS 
I 0 86.705(7) provides that a trust deed is "a deed* * *that conveys an interest in real 
I I property to a trustee in trust to secure the performance of an obligation the grantor or 
12 other person named in the deed owes to a beneficiary." Under the OTDA. therefore. it is 
13 logical to conclude that the trustee holds legal title to the lien conveyed by the trust deed 
14 and the beneficiary holds equitable title to that lien. It follows that. because :tvfERS is 
I 5 neither the trustee nor the beneficiary. it holds no interest at all in the lien conveyed by 
16 the trust deed. 
17 Relying on this court's decision in Klmnoth lrrigotion District v. United 
18 States. 348 Or 15, 227 P3d I J:~) (2010). defendants remonstrate that "legal and equitable 
I 9 rights to property can be separated and held by different parties." In Klamath Irrigation 
20 Disrric!, several irrigation districts and agricultural landowners brought consolidated suits 
2 I against the United States. claiming that temporary reductions of irrigation water by a 
22 federal agency had breached contracts for the supply of irrigation water fl-om the Klarnath 
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River Basin reclamation project. had breached an interstate compact. and had violated the 
2 Fifth Amendment by the uncompensated taking of property. In answering certified 
3 questions from a federal appeals court we held that Oregon law recognized distinct legal 
4 and equitable interests in the right to use water from the Klamath River Basin that 
5 belonged to the irrigation districts and the landmvners for whose benefit the irrigation 
6 districts held water rights. Id at 113-d1L 
7 Defendants' reliance 011 Klamath is unavailing for two reasons . First. in 
8 Klanwth. this court reiterated the principle thaL in determining whether an equitable 
9 property right exists. "a court of equity \.viii look beyond the form of the proceeding and 
10 if possible consider the substance of the right." Id at 1lif. As discussed above. any 
l l analysis of the substance of the transaction or the actual roles of the parties articulated in 
12 the trust deed compels tlte conclusion that !VIERS owns neither legal nor equitable title to 
13 the lien of the trust deed. Second. although defendants assert that "Oregon lavv explicitly 
14 recognizes that each of the foregoing property interests is capable of further division 
15 bet\veen holders of legal and equitable title," neither Klamath nor any other authority that 
I 6 defeudants have identified so holds. Certamly. au equitable interest may be fractionally 
I 7 divided among a uumber of owners (as this court recognized to be the case among the 
18 members of a water district in Klama1h), but that is not the circumstance with I'vfERS. 
I 9 Rather. defendants' point seems to be that. even though I\JERS does not 
20 have the right to receive repayment of the notes in these cases, it can nevertheless hold 
2 I legal title to the trust deeds, including the legal right to foreclose them. That proposition 
22 is not correct for t\VO reasons. First as discussed in detail in our ans\ver to the first and 
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second certified questions, the beneficiary of a trnst deed under the OTDA is the lender 
2 or the lender's successor in interest as respects the right to repayment. And it is the same 
3 beneficiary that has the other statutory rights and obligations that the OTDA confers and 
4 imposes, including the power to control the foreclosure decision and process through the 
right to appoint a successor trustee. Second. as explained in om ans\ver to the first 
6 certified question, the policy choice that the OTDA reflects (that the "beneficiary" must 
7 be the person entitled to repayment of the secured obligation) is rooted in the crnmnon-
8 lmv principle that a foreclosing party must have the pmver to enforce the underlying note. 
9 See Holton. 99 Or at 429. Accordingly. we conclude that the OTDA does not allmv 
IO l\ilERS to hold or transfer legal title lo a trust deed separately from the right to receive 
11 repayment of the obligation that it secures. Because ivfERS does not have the right to 
12 receive repayment of the notes in these cases. the OTDA does not allow TvfERS to hold 
13 and transfer legal title to the trust deeds that secure them. 
That conclusion brings us to defendants' and ivIERS's alternative argument 
L' '--
15 that iv1ERS has authority as an agent of the original beneficiary and any successor 
16 beneficiaries of the subjecl trnst deeds to take any steps that arc required or convenient to 
17 carry out the nonjudicial foreclosure process. 1·1ic accuracy of that assertion depends on 
18 whether I\fERS qualifies as an agent of those entities for purposes of Oregon law. See 
19 Resrorement {lhird) o/Agency § 1.02 (2006) ("Whether a relationship is charnctcrizecl as 
20 agency in an agreement bct\.veen parties or in the context of industry or popular usage is 
21 not controlling.''). This court has defined agency in the followmg terms: "ITJo be an 
22 'agent' -- using the we1I-defi11ed legal meaning of tliat term -- two requirements must be 
4 I 
met: (1 ) the individ1rnl mus1 be subject lo another's control: and (2) the individwil must 
2 'ac t on behalf of the other person." Vo11gh11 v. First .fransit, Inc., 346 Or 128, I 36. 206 
3 P3d 181 (2009). 
4 Pia inti US assert that. even ifrv1ERS is an agent of the beneficiaries i11 these 
5 cases. ivIERS's interests in the trnst deeds cannot extend beyond those of the beneficiaries 
6 for whom it purports to act. because its powers as an agent cannot exceed those 11eld by 
7 it s principals. Tims. when the interest or it s principal is conveyecL plai11ti ffs argue, 
8 !VlERS's authority to ac t for that principal is sinndt a.i1eously terminated. According to 
9 plaintiffs. nothing in Oregon law "supports the idea of frecs tall(ling agency on \Vhich 
IO !VIERS relics ." Moreover. plaintiff's note that at least two other courts recently have 
1 I agreed with their nrglllncnts. For example. the Arkausas Supreme Comt has held. under 
12 virtually identical statutory language: 
13 ''MERS was al best the agent of the lender. The only recorded doc ument 
ld provides notice that [Lender] is the lender and, therefo re. l'vfERS 's µrincipn l. 
15 .tvlERS assert s [Lender] is not its principal. Yet no other lender recorded its 
16 interest as an assignee of [Lender] . Permitting an agent such as lVIERS 
17 purports to be to step in and act without a recorded lender directing its 
18 action would \vreak havoc on notice in this state." 
I 9 1'/ortg oge E'/ecfronic R egisfrotion S)-stem , inc , v. So111!111 ·est H om es of--lrkrmsos. 2009 
20 Ark 152. 30 1 SW3d I, 8 (2009). 1·1 The Supreme Court of Wash i11gto11 rcceutl y reached a 
2 1 similar conclusion 
1-i Under the Arkansas statute_ "benefi ciary" 111cans "the person m1rned or 
olhcnvise designated in a deed of trust as the person fo r \Nhosc benefit a deed of trust is 
given or his successor i11 interest" Ark. Code i\n11. § 18-50-101(1) (20 10) . 
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"l\IERS atlernpts to sidestep this portion or traditional agency law by 
pointing to the language in the deeds of trnst that describe l'v1ERS 'as acting 
solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns.' * * * 
But Iv1ERS offers no authority for the implicit proposition that the lender's 
nomination of MERS as a nominee rises to an agency relationship with 
successive noteholders." 
Bain v. Metropoliton i\lortg. Group, Inc., 175 Wash 2d 83 . 107. 285 P3d 34, <l.'i-cl6 
(2012) 
Herc. plaintiffs allege that their orig.inal lenders sold and terrninated their 
respective interests in the trust deeds and 11ndcrlying promissory notes shortly atier the 
origination of plaintiJTs' loans. t\forc to the point. they allege that tl1ose original lenders 
transferred their interests in their promissory notes and trnst deeds (followed by mnltiple 
s11bseq11ent transfers as well) long. before MERS exernted or recorded a11 assignment of 
the trust deeds to the purported ultimate successors in interest of the original lenders. 111 
each or the cases. the plaintiffs assert "that the promissory 11ote was sold a11d the trnst 
deed was assigned from the originating lender of each respective loan through a series of 
subsequent intervening purchasers until it was pmportedly conveyed to the current party 
on whose behalf each of the nonjudicial foreclosures \Vas being. conduct ed." In 
partirnlar. pla intiffs assert thnt "their loans were sold f'irst to a separate e11tity known as a 
Sponsor, \Vhich subscq11e11tly sold the pro111iss01y note and ass igned the trust deed lo an 
entity knmvn as a Depositor. which snbseq11e11tly sold the promissory note and assigned 
the trnst deed to Defcndm1t. Bank of New ·York :Mellon FKA The Bank of New York, 
("BN'{t\f") as Trustee for the respective seeuritized trnsts of which BN'{i'vI acts as 
Tn1stee." 
<13 
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that. in each case. it is J'v!ERS itselC 
2 not iVfERS as "nominee" for the actual beneficiary. that executed a \V:ritten assignment of 
3 the trust deed to the reputed ultimate successor of the original lender ancl recorded that 
4 assignment in the pertinent real property records. Because :tvfERS does not qualify as the 
5 beneficiary, an assignment in such capacity is invalid. See ORS 86.705(2); 86.735(1). 
6 But, assuming. as it asserts, that l'vIERS also acts as an agent or nominee for the original 
7 beneficiary and successor beneficiaries. a different set or rules applies. 15 
8 In Oregon. agency is "[t]he relationship which results from the 
9 manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act 011 behalf and 
l 0 subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." Hampton Tree Fonns, Inc. v. 
11 Jewell, 320 Or 599. 617. 892 P2d 683. 694 (1995) (quoting Rudrzv v. Ore. Auto. Credit 
12 Corp..1790r688. 702.17cl P2d603,609(1946))(intemalquotationsomitted). The 
13 principal-agent relationship is defined by. among other things. the ongoing ability of the 
14 principal to maintain control over the agent by giving the agent instructions. See Va11ghn. 
15 346 Or at 136 (quoting Restatement 071ird) (~j'Agenl)' § 1.0 I comment f (2006)). 
L' In their a1p,umcnts to this court. defendants at times refer to lVIERS as 
lender's "agent." and at other times as lender's "nominee" (the status l'vlERS is accorcled in 
the trust deeds). Althongh the distinction is for from clear. there is some basis for 
concluding: that the authority of a nominee vis-a-vis its principal can be more limited than 
that of an ordinary agent. In that regard. we observe that Black's Low Dictio11my defines 
a "nominee." as "2. A person designated to act in place of another. usu. in a very limited 
way[ :I 3. A party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others or who receives ancl 
distributes funds for the benefit of others." Block's Low Dictionm:r l 076 (8th ed 2004). 
It may be. however. that l'vlERS and its members understood the word as a synonym for 
"agent." The record be fore us does not illuminate that issue. 
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Defendants assert that. even where multiple trust deed transfers have 
2 occurred, l'vIERS has ongoing authority to act for its past and present principals under the 
3 I'vfERS system. IvfERS explains that 
4 "[ w]hen l\IERS executes an assignment of the trust deecL it is doing so as 
5 nominee agent of the then-note owner. Plaintiffs and omic11s OTLA. 
6 \Vrongly view IvIERS as acting on behalf of the former principaL the 
7 original lender. Agency principles permit l\JERS to serve as a co1mnon 
8 aµ.ent of the oriµ.i11al lender and all successors and assiµ.ns. and all parties to 
9 the trust deed -- including the borrmver -- acknowledge that l\fERS will do 
10 this. Accordingly. when MERS executes a \Vritten assignment of'all 
l l beneficial interest under that certain Deed of Trust[.]' it is acting on behalf 
12 of the current owner of equitable title to the beneficial interests under the 
13 trust." 
14 Similarly, 0111ic11s Oregon Land Title Association asserts: 
15 "Finally, as to the answer on the fourth certified question, l\H'.RS has 
16 authority to retain and transfer legal title to a trust deed aJier a transfer of 
17 the underlying promissory note as long as the lender's successors and 
18 assigns also are members oflv1ERS. In such circumstances, the lender's 
19 successors and assigns have given l\1ERS the requisite authority to act on 
20 their behalf Thus. as long as l'vfERS remains constant as a nominee 
2 l holding legal t itlc to the trust deed for the lender and any successors or 
22 assigns, MERS has anthority to transfer legal title to the trust cleecl.'' 
23 According to defenclants and IvIERS, courts examining the issne recognize 
2'1 that l\tERS's role as nominee or agent carries fonvard to subsequent obliµ.ees -- indeed. 
2 5 del'e11cla11ts assert, that was one of the very prnposes for the creation of f\H:'.RS. 16 Those 
16 See In re T11cker, 441 BR 638. 646 (Bankr. WD l\.fo 20 l 0) ("MERS \Vas the 
agent for New Centm-y• under the Deed of Trust from the inception, and MERS became 
agent for each s11bsecp1eut note-holder under the Deed of Trust***."); Kiah v. Aurora 
Loon Services, LLC, 2011 WL 841282 at 4 (D Mass 2011) ("dissolution of [lender! 
would not and could not prevent [note holder] from obtaining an assignment of the 
mortgage from MFRS, both as a matter orlaw and according to the arrangement that 
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propositions notwithstanding. the difficulty is that, on the record before ns. it is unclear 
2 whether such a broad common agency relationship exists in these cases among rvIERS 
3 and the original lenders and their successors in interest. The trust deeds, by themselves. 
4 do not establish the necessC1ry relC1tionship: they insteC1d confuse the issue by first granting 
5 rvIERS the seemingly-narrow stains of a "nominee" and then purpotiing to grant l'vIERS 
6 authority to "exercise" other "interests" if "necessary." l'vfore importantly, although the 
7 trust deeds are signed by the borrowers. the original lenders and their successors. who are 
8 the other parties under defe11dm1ts' theory of "co111111011 agency." are not signatories. 
9 Accordingly. the answer to the second part of the fourth question depends. in large 
l 0 measure. on evidence with respect to who ultimately holds the relevant interests in the 
11 notes and trust deeds. and v1lhether that person and each of its predecessors in interest 
12 conferred authority on MERS to act on their behalves in the necessary respects. And that 
13 evidence is not present in the record before us. 
14 The answers to the t\VO parts of the fourth cert ifiecl question thus nrny be 
15 stated in the following terms: 
16 (d)(a) "Does the Ore.rwn Trust Deed Act allow l\fERS to hold a11d transfer 
17 legal title to a trust deed as nominee for the lender. after the note seemed by 
I 8 the trnst deed is transferred from the lender to a successor or series of 
existed between Iv1ERS and Aurora as a 'successor mid assign'"): illERSCORP, inc. , .. 
Romaine. 861 NE2d 81. 83 (N'{ 2006) ("1vfembers contractually agree to appoint l'v1ERS 
to act as their conunon agent on all mortgages they register in the !VIERS system."): see 
o!so Resfafemenf OhirdJ ofAgency § I .Oil (an agent may act on behalf of both a 
disclosed principal. i.e., the original lender, and a later unidentified principal. i e. original 
lender's successor and assign). 
2 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
I I 
12 
13 
1 c:J 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
successors?" 
Answer: "No." For purposes of the OTDA. the only pertinent interests in 
the trust deed are the beneficial interest of the beneficiary and the legal 
interest of the trnstee. l'vfERS holds neither of those interests in these cases. 
and therefore. it cannot hold or transfer legal title to the trust deed. For 
purposes of our answer to the first part of the fomth certified question. it is 
immaterial \Vhether the note seemed by the trust deed has previously been 
"transferred from the lender to a successor or series of successors." 
(4)(b) "Does IVIERS nevertheless have authoritv as an agent for the original 
~ ~ ~ 
lender and its successors in interest to act on their behalves \Vith respect to 
the 1101~judicial foreclosure process')" 
Answer: The power to transfer the beneficial interest in a trust deed or to 
foreclose it follows the beneficial interest in the trust deed. The beneficiary 
or its successor in interest holds those rights . .tvfERS's authority, if an~/. to 
perform any act in the foreclosure process therefore must derive from the 
original beneficiary and its successors in interest. \Ve are unable to 
determine the existence. scope. or extent of any such authority on the 
record be fore us. 
Certified questions answered. 
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KISTLEK J., concurring in part and dissenti11g in part. 
The United States District Comt for the District of Oregon has certified 
four state la\v questions to this court. In ans\vering the first two questions, the majority 
conclucles that only the lender and its successors can be designated as the beneficiary on a 
trust deed. In answering the last two questions. the majority concludes that not every 
assignment or the lender's interest in I he trust deed must be recorded and that !'vf ort gage 
'-- - "- "" 
Electronic Recording Systems. Inc. (MERS) can serve as the agent for both the lender 
and its successors if the record shows that those entities agreed to that arrangement. I 
agree with the majority's answers to the last two questions but would m1s\ver the first two 
questions differently. In my view, nothing in state law precl11des the pmiies to a trnst 
deed from designating !VIERS as the beneficiary as long as l'vlERS is serving as the agent 
for the lender a11d its successors. 1 
Bart and Jessica Brandrup executed a trust deecl on their property to secme 
a debt evidenced by a note that they gave their lender. America's Wholesale Lender. In 
their trust deed, the Brnndrups designated rvIERS "acting solely as a nominee for Lender 
and Lender's snccessors and assigns" as the "beneficiary ll11der this Security I11strument.'' 
The issue that the first two certified questions pose is whether state law required the 
Brandrnps to designate America's Wholesale Lender as the beneficiary rather than l\IERS 
In referring to the lender's successors, I am referring to those successors in 
interest that arc entitled to enforce the obligation that the trnst deed secures. 
acting as the 11on1ince or <H.>.e11t for the lender and it s successors . -~ 
. ~ · 
2 The maj ority find s a complete answer to that issue in the definition of 
3 "beneficimy" in the Oregon Trust Deed Act. See ORS 86. 70.5(2). That Act authorizes a 
4 bono\ver to grant a trnst deed 011 rea l property to secure an 1mderlying obligation -' and, in 
:'i a definitional section. provides that " '[b ]eneficiary' means a person nmned or otherwise 
6 des ignated in a trust deed as the pers011 for \Vhose bcncllt a trust deed is given. or !he 
7 person's successor i11 interest * * * " Id As the majorit y observes. a trnst deed secmes <111 
8 obligation. frequentl y eviclencecl by a promissory 11ote. and tl1e tender and its success01s 
9 are the persons for whose benefit the trnst deed is g iven: that is. the trnst deed is given to 
I 0 secure the obligation that the grcmtor of the trust deed owes the lender. That 1n11cl1 is 
I I u nexcept i ona l. 
12 It is one thing. ho\vever, to say that the statutory definition identifies the 
13 lender and its successors as the persons who ordinarily will be the beneficiaries of the 
14 trnst deed. It is qllite another to find in that definition a legislative intent to preclude lhe 
I S parties to a trust deed from designating the agent of the lender and its successors as the 
16 bene ficiary. We sho11ld be hesitant to find in that n111-of-thc-mill definition a limitation 
As the majority notes, a nominee is ;1 limited agen t. See __ Or at __ (s lip 
op at44 n 13). 
Essenti ally. a trust deed is a mort gage with the power of sale. A trnst deed 
differs from a mortgage primarily in that it conveys (1 11 interest in re<1l property to a 
trustee to secure an obligation owed the beneficimy. see ORS 86. 705(7), and. in the event 
of the grantor's clefau!t_ authorizes the trustee to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale on 
behalf of the beneficiary, see ORS 86.7 10. 
2 
on the parties' customary authority to slructurc their transact ions as they see fit_ unless the 
2 tex t, context , or history of that definitiou requires it. J11111y vievv, the statutory definiti on 
3 of beneficiary serves a more modest role than the one the majority assigns it. Certainly. 
4 nothing in the text of the de finition expressly forecloses the 1rnrties from designating: the 
5 lender's agent as the benefic iary in the trnst deed. Nor does the legislati ve history lend 
6 any support for the 111ajorit y's conclusion. Rather. the legisla tive history shows only that_ 
7 in ;1uthorizi11g lhe use of tntst deeds. the legislature sought lo provide a more cosl-
8 effective means of foreclosing liens on real property and. in doing so. to expand the pool 
9 of capital ava ilable for small homeO\vners. See rvfim1t es. House Committee on Judiciary. 
I 0 SB 11 7, April 16, 1959, at I. It is difficult to deri ve from that history any legislative 
11 intent to limit the parties' ability to des ig11atc the lender's agent as the beneficiary. 
12 To be sme, lhe cont exl provides a limita1io11 on lhe persons whom the 
13 parties may designate as the benefic iary. As noted, a trust deed, like a mortgage. serves 
14 as security for the underlying obligation -- in this case, a promissory note. Ordinarily. the 
15 mortgage fo llows the note. See Resto/ement (lhird) of Property: 1\fortgoges § 5.4(a) 
16 ( 1997) ("A trnnsl'cr or a11 obliga tion secured by a mortgage nlso trans fers the mortgage 
17 unless the parties to the tnrnsfe r agree olhcrwise."). f\1oreover, "[a ] mortgage may be 
18 enforced only by, or in behalf of a person \ ;o.,1ho is entitled to e11force the obligati on the 
19 mortgage secures. " Id § 5.'l(c). Pul di fferently, "in general a mortgage is unenforceable 
20 if it is held by one \Vho has no right to enforce the secured obligation.'' Id § 5.4 
2 1 comment c. One exception lo that general rule occms wheu the person who holds the 
22 mortgage does so as lhe "trnstce or agent" of the person who has the rig.ht to enforce the 
3 
obligation seemed by the mortgage. Id In that circumstance, the trnstec or agent may 
2 enforce the mortgage 011 behalf of the lender and its successors. 
3 On the one hand, that context suggests that the authority to name or 
4 otherwise designate the beneficiary does not extend to naming a person whose 
) designation would render the trust deed unenforceable and thus defeat its purpose. See 
6 id (noting that "in general a mortgage is unenf'orccable if it is held by one \vho has no 
7 right to enforce the secured obligation"). On the other hand, that context suggests that the 
8 class of persons statutorily authorized to be "named or otherwise designated in [the] trust 
9 deed" as the beneficiary is not limitecl to the lender and its successors, as the majority 
l 0 conclucles. Rather, it extends to persons (agents and trustees) who also may enforce the 
I 1 mortgage on behalf of the lender and its successors. Accordingly. I would hold that the 
12 statutory definition of beneficiary is broad enough to permit the parties to a tmst deed to 
13 designate MERS as the beneficiary as long as Iv1ERS is the nominee or agent of the 
14 lender ancl its successors in interest. 1 
1) Ultimately, the difference bet\vccn my answer and the majority's answer 
16 may be more semantic than substantive. After a!L in a11s\veri11g the fourth question, the 
17 majority recognizes thaL in theory, l'vfER.S can serve as the agent for the lender and its 
18 successors. The problem, as the majority correctly observes, with applying. that theory in 
The terms of the trust deed could be much clearer about the role that l'v1ERS 
plays. However, defendant argues that, under the terms of the tmst cleecl_ I'vfERS serves 
as the agent for the lender and its successors. and the terms of the trust deed permit that 
1mderstanding. 
11 
this case is that the record docs not disclose whether the lender's successors in interest 
2 also have authorized 1v1ERS to act as their agent. As I understand the majorit_y's answers. 
3 they effectively lead to the same conclusion that I would reach. Ifowever_ because I 
4 would answer the first two certified questions differently from the majority, I dissent in 
) pmt and concur iu part in its arlS\vers. 
6 Balmec C.J .. joins in this opinion concmri11g in part and dissentiug in part. 
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I BREWER, .T. 
2 This is the second of two cases this court decides today that is concerned 
3 with the nonjudicial foreclosure of trust deeds under the Oregon Trust Deed Act (OTDA) 
4 and the mortgage finance industry's practice of naming the Mo1igage Electronic 
5 Recording System, Inc., (MERS), rather than the lender, as a trnst deed's "beneficiaiy." 
6 In Brandrup v. ReconTrust Co. ,_ Or_, _ P3d _ (June 6, 2013), we answered 
7 questions certified to us by a United States District Court about whether and how that 
8 practice comports with the OTDA's nonjudicial foreclosure requirements. In the present 
9 case, we apply our answers in Brandrup to a dispute that comes to this court through a 
l 0 petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals. 
11 The underlying case is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief, 
12 brought by a home loan borrnwer against MERS and other entities that were attempting 
13 to utilize the OTDA's "advertisement and sale" procedure, ORS 86.710, to foreclose the 
14 trust deed that secured her promise to repay. Plaintiff argued that, although the trust deed 
15 identified lVIERS as the beneficimy of the trust deed, neither MERS nor any of the other 
16 entities involved in the foreclosure had any legal or beneficial interest in the trust deed 
17 that would allow them to proceed under the OTDA. The trial court granted sununary 
18 judgment to clefencla11ts, but the Court of Appeals reversed that decision, holding that a 
19 genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether all of the requirements for 1101tjuclicial 
20 foreclosure set out in the OTDA had been satisfied. Niday v. GkJAC iVlortgage, LLC, 251 
21 Or App 278, 300, 284 P3d 1157 (2012). We also conclude that a genuine issue of 
22 rnaterial fact exists, albeit a different one than the one the Comt of Appeals identified. 
l I. BACKGROUND 
2 Om analysis in this case relies heavily on our answers in Brandrup to the 
3 federal court's certified questions, and the reader would be well-advised to review our 
4 opinion in that case before delving into the present opinion. Of particular importance is 
5 the general discussion of mortgage loans and trust deeds, recordation requirements, nnd 
6 the OTDA that precedes the discussion of the certified questions. Brandrup,_ Or at _ 
7 (slip op at 4-13). Because that portion of the Brandrup opinion covers most of the 
8 necessary grom1cl, we limit the background discussion iu the present case to a brief 
9 description of MERS and its fimction in the home mortgage business. 
l 0 MERS and its parent company, MERSCorp, were created in the 1990's in 
11 response to a sharp increase in trading in mortgage loans that resulted from a developing 
12 secondary market for mortgage-backed securities. In an effort to make that market 1nore 
13 efficient, companies that were involved in making and trnding in mortgage loans, 
14 including the Federal National Mo1tgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal 
15 Home Loan Mo11gage Corporation (Freddie Mac), combined to create MERS. See, 
16 generally, R. K. Arnold, ''Yes, There is Life on MERS," 11 Prob & Prop 33, 34 (1997). 
17 MERS operates a national electronic database, the MERS System, which privately tracks 
18 trnnsfers of ownership interests and servicing rights in mortgage loans among the lenders, 
19 investors, and other companies that are its members. 
20 The present cnse examines the MERS mrnngement in the specific context 
21 of the OTDA. The OTDA allows for nortjudicinl foreclosure of a particular kind of 
22 security instrument, a trust deed. A trust deed conveys an interest in real property -- a 
2 
l lien -- to a tmstee, who holds that interest, in trnst, to secure an obligation owed by the 
2 "grantor" of the trust deed to the trust deed's "beneficiary." ORS 86. 705(2), (4), (7). 
3 Under the OTDA, if the grantor defaults on his or her obligation to the beneficiary (by, 
4 for example, failing to repay a loan made by the beneficiary), the trustee may foreclose 
5 the trust deed by "advertisement and sale" of the trust property, if certain prerequisites ar·e 
6 satisfiecL ORS 86.710, ORS 86.735. Among the listed prerequisites is a requirement that 
7 "the trust deed, any assignments of the trnst deed by the trustee or the 
8 beneficiary and any appointment of a successor trnstee [be] recorded in the 
9 mo1tgage records in the counties in which the property described in the 
10 deed is situated[.]" 
11 ORS 86.735(1). 
12 IL FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
13 With that background in mind, we tum to the facts of the present case. In 
14 2006, plaintiff obtained a loan from Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. to finance the 
15 purchase of a home in Clackamas Comity, memorializing her promise to repay the loan, 
16 with interest, in an "adjustable rate note." The note expressly stated that the note might 
17 be transferred from "Lender" (Greenpoint) to a different "Note Holder." Along with the 
18 note, plaintiff executed a "Deed of Trust" that (1) identified MERS as the trust deed's 
19 beneficiary, but solely as "no.minee for lender"; and (2) conveyed an interest in the 
20 property plaintiff had purchased to a named trustee, to secure the promise of repayment 
21 memorialized in the note and other related promises. Specifically, the trust deed 
22 provided: 
23 "The beneficiary of the Secmity Instrument is MERS (solely as norninee 
24 for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) and the successors and 
3 
1 assigns ofMERS. This Security Instrument secures to Lender: (i) the 
2 repayment of the Loan, and all renewals, extensions and modifications of 
3 the Note; and (ii) the performance of Borrnwer's covenants and agreements 
4 under this security Instrument and the Note. For this purpose, B01rnwer 
5 ilTevocably grants and conveys to Trustee, in trnst, with power of sale [the 
6 property plaintiff had financed], together with all the improvements now or 
7 hereailer erected on the property * * *. B01Tower understands and agrees 
8 that MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by Bmrnwer in t11is 
9 Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS 
10 (as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) has the right: 
11 to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not lirnited to, the 
12 right to foreclose and sell the property, and to take any action required of 
13 Lender including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this Security 
14 Instrument." 
15 In a separate definition section, the trust deed identified plaintiff as "B01rnwer," 
16 Greenpoint as "Lender," First American Title Insurance Co. as "Trustee," and MERS as 
17 "the beneficiary under this Security Instnunent." The trust deed provided that, although 
18 "Borrower" would be notified in VvTiting of any change in the entity collecting payments 
19 due under the note, "the note or a partial interest in the note (together with this Security 
20 Instrument) c[ ould] be sold one or more times without prior notice to bonower." 
21 The trust deed was recorded in the Clackamas County real property records 
22 within a fe\:\1 days after its execution. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff received notice that the 
23 servicing rights to her loan had been transferred to GMAC Mortgage, LLC (Gl'vIACM). 
24 Plaintiff thereafter made her payrnents to GMACNL At some point, plaintiff allegedly 
25 ceased to make payments. 
26 In April 2009, plaintiff received a "Trustee's Notice of Sale" from 
4 
1 Executive Trustee Services (ETS), which puq)Orted to be acting as agent for the trustee. 1 
2 The notice referred to the trust deed that plaintiff had signed and stated that, as provided 
3 in ORS 86.735, "the beneficiary [MERS] and the trustee" had elected to sell the property 
4 identified in the tmst deed (i.e., plaintiffs home), at a specified place and time, to satisfy 
5 the obligation secured by the trust deed. Plaintiff wrote to ETS, demanding that the 
6 scheduled sale be cancelled. In her letter, plaintiff pointed out that the loim had been 
7 originated by Green point, that she had never been advised of any assignment of the trust 
8 deed to MERS, ETS, or GMACM, that there was no record of any such assignment, and 
9 that it thus appeared to her that the trustee's sale had been instituted by a party or parties 
10 that had no rights in either the note or the trnst deed and, therefore, had no authority to 
11 nonjudicially foreclose. The letter ended by demanding copies of various documents 
12 relating to the trust deed, including docmnents establishing the "entire chain of title to the 
13 Deed of Trust and note." Plaintiff did not hear back fi:om ETS, but the trustee's sale was 
14 rescheduled for a later date. 
15 Before the rescheduled sale occtmed, plaintiff filed this action for 
16 injunctive and declaratory relief~ naming MERS, GMACM, and ETS as defendants. In 
17 her complaint, plaintiff described the events outlined above, and further alleged that 
18 "plaintiff has never been provided with any Assignment or other document 
19 demonstrating the transfer of the full and unencumbered interest in both the 
ETS purports to be the agent of the cmrent trustee, LSI Title Company of 
Oregon, LLC. The parties generally refer to ETS as the trustee and, hereinafter, for the 
sake of simplicity, we do so as well. 
5 
l Note and the Deed of Trust from the original lender * * *to any person or 
2 entity * * * and has no knowledge how defendant MERS or defendant ETS 
3 ever acquired any legal rights under the Note and Deed of Trust suf1icient 
4 to institute foreclosure proceedings." 
5 Plaintiff sought to enjoin the scheduled sale on the grotmd that defendants had failed to 
6 demonstrate that they had a legal interest in the tmst deed or the underlying note that 
7 would entitle them to foreclose. Plaintiff also sought declarations that (l) defendants did 
8 not have the necessary legal or equitable interests in either the note or the deed of trust to 
9 institute a foreclosure under the OTDA; (2) there had been no lawful assignment of the 
10 deed of trust "from the original lender to any of the clefenda11ts;" and (3) defendant's 
11 attempt to foreclose by advertisement and sale was "legally defective and precluded from 
12 enforcement." 
13 Defendants filed a motion for summary judg1nent, asserting it was 
14 "indisputable" that plaintiff had defaulted on her loan and that ETS and GMACM were 
15 proper parties to initiate the foreclosure. ·with respect to the latter po.int, defendants 
16 asse11ecl that MERS was "the beneficiary of the Deed of Trust, as nominee of the original 
17 lender's assignee, Aurora Bank"; that ETS was the agent of the "duly appointed 
18 successor" to the original trustee; and that G'NlACM received the right to "service" the 
19 loan from the original lender and, under its servicing agreement with the new owner of 
20 the loan, Aurora Bartle, 2 GMACM was authorized to initiate foreclosure on Aurora 
2 Amora Bank, tJ1e reputed owner of the note, is not a party to this action. 
6 
1 Bank's behalr.3 Defendants attached an affidavit by a GMACM employee and certain 
2 other inaterials in support of those assertions. Plaintiff responded that defendants' 
3 evidence was insufficient because it failed to show that (1) MERS had a beneficial 
4 interest in the prope1ty that would allow it to initiate foreclosure or to assign or transfer 
S any interest in the property to other defendants; or (2) Gl\t1ACM or EIS had obtained an 
6 interest in the trust deed by means of vaJid assignments or transfers that would allow 
7 them to foreclose. 
8 At the hearing on the summary judgment motion, the parties' arguments 
9 shifted away from a general debate about the sufficiency of MERS' and the other 
10 defendants' "interests" in the note and trust deed and toward a 111ore specific statutory 
11 question -- whether the precondition that "any assignments of the trust deed by the 
12 beneficiary*** [be] recorded in the mortgage records of the [relevant] county," ORS 
13 86. 735(1),4 had been satisfied. Defendants argued that, insofar as the beneficiary 
14 orig inally named in the trust deed remained the beneficiaiy at the time foreclosure 
l S proceedings were initiated, there were 110 "assignments of the trust deed by the 
16 beneficiaiy" to record. Plaintiff argued that l\!JERS was not the "beneficiary" within the 
3 ORS 86A. l 75 authorizes certain entities to "service or collect" mortgage 
loans "with the pennission of the lender, note owner, note holder or other holder of an 
interest in a note." For purposes of that statute, "service(ing] or collect[ing]" includes 
"exercising contractual, statutory or common law remedies, such as * * *judicial or 
nonjudicial foreclosure .'' ORS 86A. l 75(3)( e)(C). 
4 ORS 86.735(1) is set out in its entirety above, Or at (slip op at 3). 
7 
1 meaning of ORS 86.735(1) and that there was reason to believe that the true beneficiary, 
2 Greenpoint, had assigned the trust deed, because a party who was a stranger to the 
3 original transaction was trying to foreclose. According to plaintiff, the assignee's failure 
4 to record that or any subsequent assignment raised a factual question as to whether a 
5 precondition of nortjuclicial foreclosure had been satisfied. 
6 The trial court granted defendant's motion for smnmary judgment. The 
7 court concluded that MERS was the trust deed's beneficiary, and it also appeared to 
8 conclude that ETS was a lawfully appointed trustee that was authorized to foreclose 
9 under ORS 86.735 if the statutory requirements were satisfied. The court iluther 
10 concluded that, insofar as there was no evidence of any assignment of the trust deed by 
11 ETS or MERS, there was no triable issue of fact with respect to the contention that 
12 defendants had failed to satisfy the recording requirement in ORS 86.835(1). 
13 Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the summary judgment record contained 
14 evidence that Greenpoint, and not MERS, was the trust deed's original "beneficiary," and 
15 that Greenpoint had transferred its interest in the trust deed without recording the trnnsfer. 
16 Plaintiff argued that, in light of that evidence, questions of fact remained as to (1) 
17 whether MERS or the other defendants had a sufficient interest in the trust deed to initiate 
18 foreclosure under the OTDA, and (2) whether the recording requirement in ORS 
19 86.735(1) had been satisfied.5 
5 The latter point was raised in the Court of Appeals by amicus curiae 
Oregon Trial Lawyers Association (OTLA). The Court of Appeals rejected defendants' 
8 
1 The Court of Appeals reversed. Niday, 251 Or App at 301. Afte.r 
2 exarnining the definition of "beneficiary" in ORS 86. 705(2) in the context of the 
3 smTouncling stah1tes and case law, it concluded that, regardless of the trust deed's 
4 designation of MERS as "the beneficiary under this Security Instnuneut," Greeupoint, the 
5 lender whose right to repayment the tmst deed secured, was, at inception, the trust deed's 
6 "beneficiary" for purposes of the OTDA. Id at 298-99. After observing that there was 
7 evidence in the summary judgrnent record that Greenpoint had transferred its interest in 
8 the promissory note, and that, under this court's cases, a mortgage (or trust deed) is 
9 transferred by operation of law when the note it secures is transfened, the court 
10 considered whether such a transfer of the promiss01y note would constitute an 
11 "assignment[] of the trust deed" for purposes of the statuto1y requirement at ORS 
12 86.735(1). Id at 299-300. 
13 The Court of Appeals rejected defendants' contention that the statutory term 
14 "assignments" refers only to formal, written assignments that are capable of recordation 
15 in their own right. It held that the evidence that Greenpoint had transfeJTed the note 
16 created a genuine issue ofmaterial fact as to whether ORS 86.735(1) had been satisfied. 
17 Id Notably, the Court of Appeals did not address plaintiffs other argument for 
18 enjoining, and declaring invalid, the contemplated foreclosure -- that MERS and the other 
19 defendants had no legal or equitable interest in the trust deed that would permit them to 
contention that that argument had not been preserved in the trial court, and gave plaintiffs 
the benefit of OTLA's argument. 25 I Or App at 293 11 11, 300 11 l S. 
9 
l initiate foreclosure under the OTDA. 
2 III. DOES A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT REMAIN AS TO vVHETHER 
3 THE OTDA'S RECORDING REQUIREMENT, ORS 86.735(1}, 'WAS 
4 SATISFIED? 
5 Before t11is court, defendants argue that, contrmy to the Court of Appeals' 
6 decision, there is no evidence in the summary judgment record that creates a triable issue 
7 of fact as to whether a "beneficiary" of the trust deed made an "assignment" of the trust 
8 deed within the meaning of the recording requirement in ORS 86.735(1). Defendants 
9 begin with the Court of Appeals' rejection ofI\.fERS's status as "beneficiary." They argue 
10 that MERS can be, and is, the "beneficiary" of the trust deed at issue, by virtue of its 
11 designation as such in the trust deed. 
12 Defendants rely on the OTDA's definition of the term, at ORS 86.705(2): 
13 
14 "As used in ORS 86.705 to 86.795: 
15 "***** 
16 "(2) 'Beneficiary' means a person named or otherwise designated in a 
17 trust deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or the 
18 person's successor in interest, and who is not the trustee unless the 
19 beneficimy is qualified to be a trustee under ORS 86.790(1)(d)." 
20 Defendants contend that the phrase "named or otherwise designated" shows that the 
21 legislature intended that the parties to a trust deed have the ability to contractually 
22 identify the "beneficimy" without regard to whom the trust deed actually benefits. 
23 Defendants posit that the definition must be read consistently with "long established 
24 Oregon statutory and common law principles authorizing agents * * * to act as 
25 beneficimy and hold legal and record title to interests in real estate." In other words, 
26 defendants argue, the "named or otherwise designated" wording shows that the legislature 
IO 
intended to permit the lender (who usually is "the person for whose benefit the trust deed 
2 is given") to designate its agent or nominee as the trust deed's beneficiary. 
3 This comt rejected all of those arguments, and others like it, in Brandrup, 
4 _Or at_ (slip op at 13-22). In Brandrup, we noted that a proposed interpretation of 
5 the definition of the word "beneficiary" in ORS 86. 705(2) that is virtually identical to the 
6 one that defendants now offer failed to account for a significant portion of the definition's 
7 words, which focused on the beneficiary's flmction in the trust deed arrangement as "the 
8 person for whose benefit the trust deed is given." We reasoned that, to give all of the 
9 words of the definition their intended meaning, it was necessary to conclude that, in 
l 0 addition to being the person "for \vhose benefit the trust deed is given," the beneficiary 
11 must be "named or otherwise designated" as such in the trust deed. Id. at (slip op at 
12 15-16). We observed that, in a typical trust deed transaction where the obligation that is 
13 secured by the trust deed is memorialized in a promissory note, the "beneficiary" would 
14 be the person who is entitled to repayment of the note obligation, that is, either the lender 
15 or the lender's successor in interest. Id at_ (slip op at 16). Finally, we concluded that, 
16 although a lawful agent 1night have authority to act on the true beneficiary's behalf with 
17 respect to the trust deed, and might even appear on documents in the beneficiary's stead, 
18 such an agent "cannot become the 'beneficiary' for purposes of [the] statutory requirement 
19 [set out at ORS 86.735(1), which] is defined, in part, by the status of the 'beneficiary."' 
20 Id. at (slip op at 21). 
21 In the trust deed at issue here, MERS is "named" as the beneficiary ("The 
22 beneficiary of the Security Instrument is MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and 
11 
1 Lender's successors and assigns and the successors and assigns of1VIERS)[.J"). But 
2 MERS is not "the person for whose benefit the trust deed is given." Rather, the terms of 
3 the trnst deed "designate" the "Lender" (Greenpoint) as that person ("This Security 
4 Instmment secures to Lender: (i) the repayment of the Loan, and all renewals, extensions 
5 and modifications of the Note; and (ii) the performance of Borrower's covenants and 
6 agreements under this secmity Instrument and the Note."). Thus, for purposes of the 
7 requirernent for nonjudicial foreclosure that "any assignments of the trust deed by the * * 
8 * beneficiary" be recorded, the "beneficiary" of the trust deed is Greenpoint or its 
9 snccessors, and not !vfERS. 
10 Defendants argue, however, that even if "naming" MERS as the beneficiary 
11 in the trnst deed is not sufficient, by itself, to make it so, the fact remains that the trust 
12 deed conveys to MERS the right to exercise "all" of the beneficial owner's interests under 
13 the trust deed (as the beneficial owner's agent) if that should become necessary to qualify 
14 MERS as the trust deed's beneficiaiy. Defendants refer to the following provision in the 
15 trnst deed: 
16 "Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the 
17 interests granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessmy 
18 to co1nply with law or custom, AfERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender's 
19 successors and assigns) has the right: to e.wrcise any or a11 of those 
20 interests, including, bnt not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the 
21 property, and to take any action required of Lender including, but not 
22 limited to, releasing and cai1celing this Security Instrument." 
23 (Emphasis added.) Anticipating an argument that the trust deed beneficiary must have a 
24 right to receive repayment of the loan obligation that the trust deed secures, defendants 
25 contend that the foregoing provision conveys to MERS, ''if necessary to comply with law 
12 
or custom," a right to receive payment of the loan obligations on behalf of the lender or 
2 noteholder." 
3 But the right to "receive" payment on a note "on behalf of" a principal is 
4 distinct from the right to repayment on one's own behalf. As discussed above, it is the 
5 latter right that defines a trust deed "beneficiary" in the ordinary trust deed transaction. 
6 Or at (slip op at 11) (the beneficiary is the person "entitled to repayment of the note 
7 obligation"). Thus, as this court observed in Brandrup, \Vith respect to identical wording 
8 in the trust deeds at issue in that case, "[ u ]nless the * * * provision transforms l\!IERS into 
9 [the person to \Vhom the obligation that the trust deed secures is owed], it cannot 
l 0 trnnsfonn MERS into the 'beneficiary' of the trust deed." Brandrup, _Or at_ (slip op 
11 at25). 
12 As broad as the "law or custom" provision appears to be, it is not broad 
13 enough to convey that particular right. As this court explained in Brandrup: 
14 "The provision first states that MERS holds 'only legal title to the interests 
15 granted by borrower in this Security Instrmnent.' When the provision 
16 thereafter states that MERS has the right 'to exercise any or all of those 
17 interests, if necessary to comply with law or custom, it refers to the 
18 interests 'granted by the borrower in this security instrument."' 
19 Id nt (slip op at 25) (emphasis in original). But the only interests tlrnt nre granted by Cl 
20 borrower in n trust deed nre a legal interest in the real property that the trust deed burdens 
21 and that legal interest's beneficial counterpart. Thus, the "law or custom" provision 
22 cannot convey to MERS the right that would qualify it as the trust deed's beneficiary --
23 the right to repayment of the obligation that the trust deed secmes. It follows that, 
24 regardless ofMERS' designation as such in the trust deed, and regardless of wording in 
13 
the trust deed that purports to grant IvfERS various "interests" belonging to the lender "if 
2 necessary to comply with law or custom," MERS cannot be the beneficiary of the trust 
3 deed in this case. Rather, insofar as the trnst deed "secures to Lender" the "repayment of 
4 the Loan" and other covenants relating to that obligation, the lender (Greenpoint) was the 
5 original "beneficiary" of the trnst deed for purposes of the OTDA. The Court of Appeals 
6 did not elT in so holding. Niday, 251 Or App at 298-99. 
7 Defendants argue that, in any event, the Court of Appeals erred in 
8 concluding that an issue of fact existed with respect to whether there had been any 
9 "assignment[] of the trnst deed" by Greenpoint that triggered the recording requirement in 
10 ORS 86. 735(1). In so holding, the Court of Appeals relied on (l) evidence that the 
11 promiss01y note secured by the trnst deed had been transfened, and (2) the legal premise 
12 that a trnst deed is "assigned" by operation of law when the underlying promissory note is 
13 transfeITed. Niday, 251 Or at 299. But defendants contend that, when, as a prerequisite 
14 to nonjudicial foreclosure, the legislature adopted the requirement in ORS 86.835(1) that 
15 "any assignments of the trust deed by the trustee or the beneficia1y" be recorded, it did 
16 not intend that "assigmnents" include transfers of a promissory note that result in an 
I 7 equitable transfer of the associated trust deed by operation oflaw. To tbe contrary, 
18 defendants argue, the legislature intended to require recorclation only of formal , written 
19 assignments of the trust deed. 
20 Again, this is an issue that was discussed and decided in Brandrup, but this 
2 1 time, Brandrup supports defendants' interpretation of the statutory phrase. In Brandrup, 
22 this court concluded that the phrase "any assignments" was not, itself: dispositive. We 
14 
l noted that ORS 86.735(1) -- and the very concept ofrecordation -- assumes the existence 
2 of an assignment iu recordable form, i.e. , a written document that is separate from the 
3 note and that describes the burdened property. We acknowledged that parties to the 
4 transfer of a promisso1y note cm1 always memorialize the transaction in a separate writing 
5 that is recordable, but we observed that ORS 86.735(1) does not express any requirement 
6 that that be done. Brandrup, _ Or at _ (slip op at 31 ). 
7 We noled, further, that ORS 86.735(1) bears a resemblance to a statute that 
8 was in effect when the OTDA \Vas enacted in 1959 that proviclecl, in part, that "every 
9 assignment of mortgage shall be recorcled,"former ORS 86.070 (1959).6 This court had 
10 interpreted that statute in Barringer v. Loder, 47 Or 223, 224-28, 81 P 778 (1905), as 
11 recognizing that a mortgage could be transferred by indorsement of the associated 
12 promissory note, but as only requiring the recording of those assignments of mortgage 
13 that were "in writing, executed and acknowledged with the same fonnaJity as required in 
14 deeds and mortgages of real property." \Ve concluded in Brandrup that the legislature 
15 likely had former ORS 86.070 (1959) in mind when it adopted siruilar wording in ORS 
16 86. 735(1), and that it intended l'o assign a similar, narrow rneaning to the term 
17 "assignment" in the latter statute. Brandrup, _ Or at -· (slip op at 33-34). We 
18 concluded, in other words, that in providing that a trnstee may nonjudicially foreclose 
19 only if "any assignments of the trust deed by the trustee or beneficiary * * * are 
6 Former ORS 86.070 was repealed .in 1965. Or Laws 1965, ch 252, § 1. 
15 
1 recorded," ORS 86. 735(1) refers to written assignments of a trust deed in recordable 
2 form, and not to assignments of trust deeds that result by operation of law by transfer of 
3 the note. 
4 According to that understanding, although the Court of Appeals correctly 
5 observed that there is evidence in the summary judgment record that the trust deed's 
6 be11eficiary, Greenpoint, sold the promissory note associated with the trust deed, that 
7 transaction does not qualify as an "assignment(] of the trust deed" for purposes of the 
8 recording requirement of ORS 86.735(1). Neither is there evidence in the summary 
9 judgment record of any "assignment" of the trust deed in the intended sense, that is, a 
10 fornrnl , written assignment of the trnst deed, itself. Thus, on the question of whether 
11 defendants violated ORS 86.735(1) by initiating foreclosure when Greenpoint sold the 
12 promissory note but did not record an assignment of the trust deed, there is no issue of 
13 material fact. 
14 IV. DOES A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT REMAIN? 
15 That leaves us to consider whether a genuine issue of material fact exists 
16 that is pertinent to plaintiffs original challenge to the scheduled foreclosure sale -- that 
17 none of defendants possessed a qualifying legal interest in the trust deed or note that 
18 would allow them to initiate foreclosure under the OTDA. That challenge is based on 
19 plaintifi's allegations that she had received a "Trustee's Notice of Sale" that refeITed to 
20 ETS as the trnstee of the trust deed and 1v1ERS as its beneficiary, that, in spite of the trust 
21 deed's designation of MERS, the original beneficiary was the lender, and that plaintiff 
22 had no knowledge or information as to whether or how any of defendants had acquired 
16 
I any legal rights in the note and trnst deed that were sufficient to institute foreclosure 
2 proceedings. 
3 In support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants submitted (I) 
4 copies of the promisso1y note and trust deed; (2) an affidavit by an employee of the loan 
S servicer (G1v'fACM) describing what defendants believed were the relevant transactions; 
6 (3) a report fron1 the MERS database showing the same transactions; and (4) a copy of 
7 MERS's appointment of ETS as a successor to the original trustee, showing that the 
8 appointment had been recorded in the county land records. 7 Defendants asserted that that 
9 evidence established that 
I 0 "GMACM, as the hokier of the original note and servicer of plaintiff's loan, 
11 properly initiated the foreclosme of the Deed ofTrnst on behalf of MERS, 
12 the beneficiary of the Deed of Trust as the nominee of the original lender's 
13 assignee, Aurora Bank. LSI [(ETS's principal)], the duly appointed 
14 successor trustee, properly executed the non-judicial foreclosure." 
15 Plaintiff responded that defendants' evidence relied on the legitimacy of lvlERS's status as 
16 the trust deed's beneficiary. Plaintiff insisted that MERS was not the trust deed's 
17 beneficimy, but a mere nominee of the beneficiary, and that it therefore lacked authority 
18 not only to foreclose, but also to assign interests in the trust deed or underlying note to 
In the hearing, defendants apparently produced the original promissory 
note. It is unclear from the record what, if anything, the note showed about the person 
entitled to enforce the note or, if different, the ow11er of the note. We know that 
GMACM claimed to be "holding" the note in its capacity as servicer of the loan, and that 
GMACM did not claim to own the note or to act on its own behalf in the foreclosure 
proceeding. There is .no evidence in the record as to whether or how the note had been 
transferred to GMACM. 
17 
l others. Plaintiff also pointed to defendants' failure to produce, in response to her 
2 demands, any document showing that MERS or ETS had acquired interests in the note 
3 and trnst deed that would entitle them to nonjudicially foreclose. 
4 Because the trial court did not include any explanation of its decision in its 
5 written order, its reasons for granting summmy judgment for defendants must be 
6 discerned from its comments during the summary judgment hearing. Those comments 
7 suggest, on the one hand, that the court accepted MERS's designation as beneficiary in 
8 the trnst deed as conclusive evidence of that status, and thus concluded that no triable 
9 issue of fact existed with respect to :NffiRS's authority to initiate (or, specifically, to direct 
I 0 the trnstee to initiate) a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding. But the trial court also 
11 suggested that the question of whether the trustee was act ing on behalf of a lawful 
12 beneficiary was a 1natter between the trustee and the beneficiary, not one that the 
13 bonower could assert to derail a foreclosure under the statute. At any rate, the court 
14 appeared to conclude that defendants' evidence established ETS's authority, as a validly 
15 appointed successor to the original trustee, to direct or participate in a nonjudicial 
16 foreclosure proceeding under ORS 86. 73 5. The Co mt of Appeals' opinion did not 
17 address either of those appareut conclusions or the broader quest ion of whether 
18 defendants had interests in the note and trust deed that would authorize them to proceed 
19 with foreclosure under the statute. \Ve now turn to those issues. 
20 We begin with the trial court's apparent conclusion that the summary 
2 1 judg1nent record conclusively established that MERS was the beneficiary of the trust 
22 deed and, thus, was entitled to initiate a foreclosure proceeding. That determination 
18 
1 appears to rest entirely on the fact that the trust deed, which was recorded in the pertinent 
2 real property records, identified MERS as its "beneficiary." 
3 However, as discussed above, _ Or at_ (slip op at 11-14), and in 
4 Brandrup,_ Or at_ (slip op at 13-27), the fact that l'vIERS was identified in the trust 
5 deed as the "beneficiary" does not make it so for pmposes of the OTDA. Rather, the 
6 "beneficiary'' is the person to whom the obligation that t11e trust deed secures is owed, 
7 Brandrup,_ Or at _ (slip op at 22), in this case, either the lender or its successor. As 
8 noted above, _ Or at _ (slip op at 13-14), under that meaning, .lvfERS is not the trust 
9 deed's beneficiary. MERS therefore cannot claim any authority, as the trust deed's 
10 beneficiary, to initiate or direct the nonjudicial foreclosure of a trust deed. 
11 Still, as this court recognized in Brandrup, _ Or at _ (slip op at 41-46), 
12 even if MERS lacks authority to act as the trust deed's beneficiary, it may have authority 
13 to act on behalf of the beneficimy if it can demonstrate that it has an agency relationship 
14 with the beneficimy and that the agency agreement is sufficiently expansive. Although in 
15 Brandrup we discussed that possibility in connection with the issue of MERS' authority 
16 to assign a trust deed, it would seem to apply equally to the present issue ofMERS's 
17 authority to foreclose the trust deed. In either case, MERS' authority to act as the 
18 beneficiaiy's agent depends on who succeeded to the lender's rights, whether those 
19 persons manifested consent that MERS act on their behalf and subject to their control , 
20 and whether lVIERS has agreed to so act. Brandrup,_ Or at_ (slip op at 44) (citing 
21 Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. v. Jewell , 320 Or 599, 617, 892 P2d 683 , 694 (1995)). 
22 Although Brandrup is not a summary judgment case, it nevertheless is 
19 
instructive with respect to how MERS' status as a trust deed beneficiary's agent, and the 
2 nature and scope of its authority as an agent, might be established. In that case, this court 
3 rejected the proposition that MERS's designation in a trnst deed as "nominee for Lender 
4 and Lender's successors and assigns" established nn agency relationship between MERS 
5 and the original lender or any successor to the original lender. We did so primarily 
6 because the original lender and its successors were not signatories to the trnst deed. _ 
7 Or at _ (slip op at 46). We acknowledged, however, that, depending on its terms, the 
8 much-discussed agreement between MERS and members might establish MERS's 
9 authority to act as a "common agent" for the original lender and any successors who are 
10 members ofMERS. Brandmp, _ Or at _ (slip op at 23 11 7, 46). And, Brandrup aside, 
11 there is always the possibility of a separate agreement between MERS and a lmder' s 
12 successors iu interest, authorizing MERS to act as the successors' agent .in a foreclosure 
13 proceeding. 
14 But, as far as we can tell, there is nothing in the summary judgment record 
15 in this case that idmtifiesthesuccessorsto the original lmder'sinterestsor shows that 
16 1\ilERS is authorized, as the agent of the successors to the original I ender's interests, to 
17 iuitiate or direct a no1tiudicial foreclosure proceeding under the OTDA. There is some 
18 evidence that the cuJTeut owner of the note is Aurora Bank and that Aurora Bank is a 
19 member oHvfERS. But there is no evidence as to whether Aurora Bank is a successor to 
20 the original lender's interests. Nor is there evidence of an agency agreement between 
21 Aurora Bank and MERS, or between MERS and its members as a whole, much less one 
22 that authorizes MERS to initiate foreclosures on behalf of Aurora Bank. hu-ther, there is 
20 
l some suggestion that GMACM is the "holder" of the note. If the note is negotiable, it is 
2 possible that GMACM is a successor to the original lender's interests or that both Aurora 
3 Bank and GMACivl share that role; however, neither the record nor the parties' arguments 
4 establish those matters beyond genuine dispute. 8 
5 The h·ial court nevertheless appeared to reason9 that the beneficiary's 
6 authority in a decision to proceed with nonjudicial foreclosure is inunateriaJ. To the 
7 extent that the court so reasoned, we disagree. On the one hand, it is true that the trustee, 
8 and only the trustee, is authorized to foreclose a trust deed by advertisement and sale. 
9 ORS 86.710, ORS 86.735. However, the OTDA contemplates that the beneficiary of the 
l 0 trust deed -- the original lender or its successor -- is entitled to determine whether and 
11 how to foreclose a trust deed after default. For example, ORS 86. 710 expressly provides 
12 that the beneficiary ca11 reject the nonjndicia I foreclosure procedure in favor of an 
The patties have not addressed the identity of the beneficiary if, as we 
conclude, it is not MERS. That issue is by no means academic. If a note is negotic1ble, 
the "party entitled to enforce the note" (the "PETE") under ORS 73.0301 may not be the 
same person as the owner of the note, that is, the party entitled to the economic benefits 
of the note. Because a mortgage or trust deed follows the note that it secures, United 
Stares Nat. Bank v. Holton, 99 Or 419, 428-29, 195 P 823 (1 92 1 ), the potential separation 
of ownership and PETE status rai ses the que:;ti on of whether a I ender's successor -- that 
is, the beneficiary -- must be the owner, the PETE, or both? Most courts that have thus 
far addressed the issue have concluded that PETE status, not ownership, confers the right 
to foreclose. See, e.g., Edelstein v. NY kfellon, 286 P3cl 249, 257 (Nev 2012). Because 
the parties have not mldressed the issue, we do not discuss it further here. 
9 The court opined that the foreclosure of the trust deed at issue could 
proceed, without regard to whether .MERS \.Vas authorized to act as the trust deed's 
beneficimy, because "we have a trustee and the trnstee is foreclosing." 
2 1 
l ordinary judicial foreclosure. More importantly, the beneficiary has absolute authority to 
2 appoint a successor trustee at c.my time atler a trust deed is executed under ORS 
3 86. 790(3), an authority that all but guarantees the beneficiary's control over any 
4 foreclosure decision. 
5 However, even if the beneficiary's authority were immaterial , summary 
6 judgment still would be improper in the present case. That is so because, on the present 
7 record, MERS' involvement in the appointment of the current trustee casts doubt on the 
8 trustee's status. The h·ial court concluded that ETS was the lawfully appointed trustee 
9 ("of record, we have* * * the chain, if you will, back to the original trustee F irst 
10 American Title"). The trial court apparently relied on a docmnent in the summaiy 
11 judgment record showing that .tvtERS had appointed ETS as successor to the original 
12 trustee, and also showing that the appointrnent had been recorded in the Clackamas 
13 Cotmty real property records. But, appointments of a successor trnstee may only be made 
14 by the trust deed beneficiary, ORS 86.790(3), and, as discussed, MERS is not, and never 
15 has been, the beneficiary of the trnst deed for purposes of the OTDA. In the absence of 
16 evidence i11 the record showing the identity of the lender's successors in interest and that 
17 1vfERS had authority to act for those successors in interest, 10 an issue of fact remains as to 
18 the validity of ET S's appointment as successor trustee, and, in consequence, its authority 
10 As discussed above,_ Or at _ (slip op at 20-2 1), there is nothing in the 
sun1mary judgrnent record t"liat establishes MERS's authority to act as the agent for 
anyone. 
22 
I to initiate and pursue a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding under the OTDA. 11 It follows 
2 that the trial court e1Tecl in granting summary judgment to defendants. 
3 The decision of the Court of Appeals is affinned. The judgment of the 
4 circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that comt for further proceedings. 
II This same logic would apply to any contention that GNlACM had authority 
to direct nonjudicial foreclosure as the servicer of the loan with the lender's or note 
owner's/holder's permission to proceed, ORS 86A. l 75(l), (3)(e)(C). Even if there were 
undisputed evidence iu the record showing that G:rvfACM had the required status or 
authority to direct a nonjudicinl foreclosure (and there is not), the uncertain state of the 
record with respect to ETS's status as the trustee still would preclude summary judgment. 
23 
1 KISTLER, J. , concurring in part and specially concurring. 
2 For the reasons stated in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in 
3 part in Brandrup v . Recontrnst Company, N.A., _Or __ , __ P3d _ (decided this 
4 date), I concur in part in the majority's reasoning and in its judgment. 
5 Balmer, C.J., joins in this opinion concurring in part and specially 
6 concurring. 
l 
